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US PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO
MULTINATIONAL CORPS SYSTEM

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MARK R. MUELLER, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1984

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ABSTRACT

US PARTICPATION IN THE NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS by MAJ Mark R. Mueller, USA, 123 pages.

This study investigates the NATO multinational corps to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in these corps. The investigation is conducted in three steps. First, the study analyzes US participation in coalition warfare in World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and Desert Shield/Storm. This analysis indicates that the benefits and obstacles to fighting as part of a combined formation transcends both time and technology, that the US perceives a requirement to fight as part of a coalition, and that an analysis of these coalitions provides criteria from which to evaluate combined formations. Second, the study analyzes the NATO multinational corps to determine what advantages, disadvantages and consequences these corps have for NATO. The study reveals that the combined corps are militarily viable multinational formations which furnish NATO several advantages and address many of the problems inherent in combined formations. Third, the study investigates US participation in the multinational corps. The investigation reveals that the corps afford the US many advantages, few disadvantages, and have the ultimate consequence of providing a training ground and test-bed for the US, in consonance with its national military strategy, to better prepare to fight and win as part of a combined force.

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LIST OF ABBRIEVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
ACE	Allied Command Europe
AEF	American Expeditionary Force
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Region
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARRC	ACE Rapid Response Corps
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
C3IC	Coalition Coordination, Command, Control, Communication, and Integration Center
CFE	Conventional Forces Europe
CFSOP	Combined Standard Operating Procedures
COMLANDCENT	Commander Land Forces Central Region
COSSAC	Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander
CTC	Combat Training Center
IFOR	Implementation Force
LOC	Line of Communication
MDF	Main Defense Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
OPCON	Operational Control
STANAG	Standard NATO Agreement
UNRC	United Nations Reception Center

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the 1991 London Summit, NATO committed itself to a multinational corps structure.[1] Formerly, NATO combined multinational forces at the operational and strategic level of war and assigned very strict national Areas of Responsibility (AORs). NATO organized in this manner in order to reduce the problems which have been historically inherent to multinational or combined operations.[2] NATO's multinational corps structure now combines operations at the tactical level of war, mixing units down to brigade level. The United States participates in this structure by providing a division both to the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), to the II (GE/US) Corps and through forming the V (US/GE) Corps. The United States participates in these corps although national assets exist within the NATO Central Region to fight as a pure US corps. The United States has adopted this structure despite the fact that "a combined operation is never likely to achieve the same amount of combat power as a strictly national operation."[3] It is important therefore, to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and future consequences of the US Army's participation in the multinational corps system.

This paper will advance the premise that despite some disadvantages, US participation in the multinational corps system has potential advantages and positive consequences for the US Army and for the US military as a whole. The US military must, however, study the lessons learned from participation in the multinational corps system and

apply these lessons. Concrete application requires creating a system which takes lessons learned from the multinational corps system and applies these lessons to future training, force structure, equipment, and doctrine. Consequently, the US military will form a base of multinational operational experience increasing its ability to operate tactically in combination not only with a NATO ally, but also with other foreign armies that may contribute to a coalition force involving US participation.

Background

In order to fully understand the importance of determining the advantages, disadvantages, and future consequences of US participation in the multinational corps, it is important to examine the background of the formation of the multinational corps system, the level of NATO participation and the level of US participation. Also important to consider are the difficulties of participation in a multinational corps system in war. Upon completion of the description of the background of the multinational corps system, the need to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US military participation in the multinational corps will be better understood.

The background of the NATO multinational corps system lies with the end of the Cold War and NATO's need to redefine its relevance for the future. The dissolution of the Soviet Union represented, to some, the end of a need for a strong NATO military presence. However, as ethnic divisions have fragmented the former Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe, and as these new nations have attempted to redefine their existence apart from each other and Russia, instability has increased.[4] As William T. Johnson and Thomas Durell-Young stated in their examination of the NATO's new security environment, while "all may hope for and anticipate a positive outcome [in Eastern Europe], that

condition is not guaranteed."[5] The events occurring within former Yugoslavia and in virtually all the former Soviet States--particularly Russia--bear this instability out. Also, the threat posed by some states of the former Soviet Union cannot be completely ruled out. "Regardless of the limits placed on forces by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the USSR [Russia] will retain its long-term capacity for military dominance."[6] Despite these various threats to NATO interests, NATO nations perceived that because of the end of the Cold War they had to reduce force levels and the national resources required for each nation to continue to provide military forces to NATO. This reduction plan is drastic in the NATO Central Region. For example, by 1997 overall military presence may sink to only 25 percent of the 1990 NATO force levels.[7] With these cuts in mind, the NATO 1991 Rome Conference mandated the use of a NATO strategy which relies on fewer forces, held at a lower readiness status, but also retains forces that have improved "mobility, flexibility, and adaptability to different contingencies and greater use of multinational formations."[8] Therefore the need to reduce force levels in NATO led to the formation of the multinational corps system that exists within NATO today.

The NATO nations formed six multinational corps in order to answer the needs of NATO to reduce force levels and reduce the resources that the NATO member nations must maintain to support NATO interests (these corps are depicted in Appendix A).[9] NATO integrated these multinational formations into the first two of three force tiers. The first tier of forces consist of Rapid Reaction Forces immediately available to "respond quickly and flexibly to crisis developments on land, in the air and at sea."[10] The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is the NATO land force which is designed to fulfill this mission. The second tier of forces consists of main defense forces (MDF) which

constitute "a mix of active and mobilizable formations, with the ultimate ratios depending on specific national circumstances."[11] The MDF consists of the GE/DA (LANDJUT), GE/NL, GE/US, US/GE, and the EURO (GE/FR/BE) Corps. The final tier of forces consists of Augmentation Forces which will form NATO's operational and strategic reserves. Augmentation forces would consist largely of reinforcements from the United States and Canada.[12]

The NATO second and third tier forces depend on a long lead time to mobilize. The creation of the combined corps within the Central Region has reduced standing forces 75 percent since 1990. NATO national requirements to field forces have lessened and therefore so too have the requirements for the resourcing of those units. Therefore, though the resourcing costs may be deceptive, NATO met the requirement to reduce NATO forces in Europe through the use of multinational formations.[13]

The US participation in the multinational corps system is significant. The United States contributes one division to the ARRC, the first NATO tier, and that same division is also a member of the GE/US Corps as a part of the second NATO tier. The United States forms the headquarters and provides another division and corps troops for the US/GE Corps. The fact that one of the US divisions is committed to two different Corps upon the Transfer of Authority to the Multinational Corps has created some consternation within the NATO corps to which this division is committed. However, "US forces are in the Central Region not simply to "defend" that region, but are centrally located within the European Theater to cooperate with our allies in defense of all regions in ACE (Allied Command Europe)."[14] The US also retains its forces in Europe as a nationally pure corps capable of deploying under unilateral national commands. The US Corps structure in Europe is depicted in Appendix B. As multi-state coalitions are "unwieldy and fragile" it may

be questionable why the United States would commit itself to a multinational corps in Europe, especially the GE/US and the US/GE Corps, when national assets to fight as a nationally pure corps are in theater.[15]

While NATO and the United States recognize the political advantage of reducing the presence of forces within the Central Region and the economic advantage of reducing defense costs in NATO, they also recognize that multinational units complicate the conduct of combat operations. The lessons of history in this century alone demonstrate the complications of combined or multinational allied warfare at any level. Sir Frederick Maurice wrote in his observations of British and French multinational operations in World War I that:

> It is obviously more difficult to conduct war successfully, to come to prompt decisions and to preserve secrecy, when it is necessary to obtain agreement between different governments and to win the consent of an allied general than it is when decisions rest with one government.[16]

Combined warfare is also more complicated, and a source of weakness easily exposed to the enemy, in which the "areas of commonality binding members together are usually less than the policy differences which remain."[17] These complications arise from varying national goals, different doctrines, leadership techniques, languages, training levels, and different equipment capabilities.[18] These are all significant obstacles that the multinational corps must overcome in order to be militarily effective. As Johnsen and Durell-Young indicate in their article, the multinational corps system will require NATO to achieve a "unique degree of cooperation among its members obliging standardization, interoperability and alterations in the wartime command structure."[19]

The United States is seemingly assuming great risk in adopting a multinational structure in Europe. While some of the nations of NATO

may be driven to tactical-level multinationalism by a lack of resources in theater, the United States is not. The United States has all of the assets in the Central Region to fight as a nationally pure corps. Furthermore, the corps is the tactical basis from which US units fight. It is designed to fight as an entity with all of the combat support and combat service support assets "concentrated at corps to allow the corps commander to mass fires and combat power at key...points across the depth and breadth of the battlefield."[20] When detaching a division to form a part of another multinational corps, insufficient assets are available to the corps commander to provide for this flexibility to support both the corps and an independent division that might be separated by hundreds of kilometers as part of another multinational corps which may be like most European armies, built around a division or brigade base. It is very possible that either "the corps might be weakened or the separated division might not have enough assets to accomplish its mission in the most effective manner."[21] If this mission accomplishment is indeed at stake, it is extremely important to determine what advantages, disadvantages and consequences can possibly arise from US participation in the multinational corps system.

The problem of whether there are disadvantages, advantages, and positive consequences which arise from US participation in the multinational corps is very important to determine. Since 1900, with our participation in quelling the Boxer Rebellion in China, we have seldom used military force unilaterally. Our many military alliances demonstrate this fact. In a time in which the US Army structure has been reduced to ten divisions, one fifth of the US Army is committed to multinational corps system in Europe. Adding the 2nd Infantry Divisions' participation as part of a combined Korean Corps, fully one third of the US Army is committed to combined corps as part of

alliances.[22] In a time of shrinking resources and expanding US military involvement around the world, the US should determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of participating as part of multinational corps in Europe. The United States ought to also interpret these advantages, disadvantages, and consequences and apply lessons learned from its participation in these multinational corps in order to ensure US forces are ready to fight and win in support of US national security interests.

Methodology

This paper will use a three step methodology to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of the US Army involvement in the multinational corps system. The first step will examine historical examples from the twentieth century to derive common criteria for the building of successful combined forces at the tactical and operational level of war. The historical analysis will also examine the likelihood, based upon historical precedent, of the US conducting combined or multinational operations in the future. The second step will analyze the multinational corps system purpose, structure, and missions. This step will apply the parameters derived during the historical analysis to test the viability the multinational corps in which US forces participate. The third step will evaluate the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of the US military's participation in the multinational corps system in relation to the nation's current national military strategy. The analysis of US participation in NATO's combined corps will also investigate how the US Army applies the lessons learned from participation in the multinational corps system to future force structure, doctrine, training, and equipment. This three step methodology will, then, provide a mechanism with which to fully investigate the advantages, disadvantages, and

consequences that may arise from US participation in the multinational corps system. In order to fully understand what each step of the methodology will provide, each step should be examined in detail.

A historical review of successful and unsuccessful military combined operations at the tactical level of war will provide certain principles with which to evaluate the viability of future multinational units. The analysis will examine corps level combined operations in four major conflicts: World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The historical analysis will also examine the frequency with which the United States has conducted combined operations at the corps level since 1917 as an indicator of the likelihood of conducting more combined operations in the future. This first step will, then, suggest principles for the building of successful multinational organizations at the tactical level of war and provide a springboard from which to evaluate the potential tactical or operational success of the NATO multinational corps system.

The second step of the analysis will analyze the purpose, structure, and missions of the multinational corps overall and then focus on the combined corps in which the United States take part. Using the results of several exercises and the use of established combined standard operating procedures (SOPs) and command relationships and agreements these multinational corps will be evaluated based on the criteria determined during the historical review to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of participation in such an organization at the tactical and operational level. This analysis will also judge the military potential of these forces involved in training as a combined organization in peace. The analysis will, therefore, indicate whether or not the multinational corps system affords NATO a viable military force. This step of the methodology will also provide a

stepping stone to the analysis of how US participation in the multinational corps furthers US national military strategy.

The third step of the methodology will examine the multinational corps system from a purely US national point of view to determine benefits from participation in the multinational corps system. Specifically, this step will analyze the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system in relation to the current US national military strategy. This step will also ascertain how the Army could gain from the examination of lessons learned from combined operations as part of the multinational corps. The analysis should provide an answer as to how the US could apply these lessons to future force structure, doctrine, training, and equipment or if these lessons learned are irrelevant when applied outside of the units participating in the multinational corps. Therefore at the conclusion of this step, the question as to whether or not US participation in the multinational corps is really in the security interests of the United States within and outside of NATO should be answered.

Each step of the methodology will build upon the other ultimately leading to a complete answer as to the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system. The advantages and disadvantages of participation in combined tactical operations should be clear upon completion of the historical review, the analysis of the multinational corps and the analysis of US participation within the multinational corps system. Finally, this methodology will provide a mechanism to determine if participation in the multinational corps has a possible future benefit and whether or not the NATO combined corps support US national military strategy and national security interests. Upon completion of this

analysis, the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system will be evident.

In order to focus research in the next few chapters, this paper will limit the scope in two different ways. First, the historical analysis will only look at combined operations in World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and Operation Desert Storm. Although there are a myriad of examples throughout history that certainly bear out the problems and benefits of operating as part of a multinational force, these four conflicts provide the best recent examples of corps and division level combined tactical operations. Secondly, as the historical examples might dictate, the research will focus on the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of combined operations at the mid- to high-intensity warfare scenario. This is not done to exclude multinational military operations other than war (MOOTW) from possibly benefiting from the experiences gained from the multinational corps system. It is simply that multinational MOOTW add a new very complicated political dimension down to the actions of each individual soldier and is excluded to simply limit the scope of the paper. While these limitations may restrict the scope of the paper and research, they do not necessarily limit the applicability to the conclusions drawn at the end of the examination of this topic.

Terms and Definitions

In order to provide a common understanding of terms that the paper will use in discovering the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system, this paper will define the following terms:

Levels of War. There are three levels of war--strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level of war is concerned "with national or, in specific cases, alliance or coalition

objectives."[23] An example of the execution of a decision on the strategic level of war is the World War II Allied decision to defeat Germany first and then focus Allied efforts to defeat the Japanese, the "Germany First Doctrine." The operational level of war is concerned with the attainment of strategic objectives through "design, organization, and the conduct of campaigns and major operations."[24] An example of this level of war is the D day landings, "Operation Overlord," where these landings were the first step or campaign in achieving the strategic goal of defeating Germany in World War II. Finally the tactical level of war is "concerned with the execution of battles and engagements."[25] These tactical battles "are fought to achieve operational results."[26] Continuing the World War II analogy, the series of battles and engagements fought on the US and British beaches of Utah or Juno in support of "Operation Overlord," represent the tactical level of war. As this work is looking at corps level operations and below, the emphasis is predominately at the tactical level and somewhat into the operational level of war. While the US Corps is capable of functioning as a "totally independent unit [therefore at the strategic and operational level of war], such employment is unlikely."[27] Corps and their subordinate divisions "are the link between the operational and tactical level of war."[28] These forces "create and maintain the success of the current battle and set up the conditions for the success of future battles."[29]

Alliances and Coalitions. Nations conduct multinational or combined operations--the terms multinational and combined are synonymous--within the context of either coalitions or alliances.[30] An alliance is an organization which is "a result of formal agreements between two or more nations. . . . Alliance operations are combined operations."[31] Alliances, because of their formal and long term nature,

attempt to establish a common doctrine and a degree of interoperability.[32] Within the context of this work, multinational corps are formed from the agreement of an alliance, the NATO alliance. Therefore, the current advantages and disadvantages of participation in the multinational corps system arise from an alliance. A coalition is "an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action."[33] Therefore coalitions are formed on short notice and may consist of forces not used to working with each other.[34] The future consequences of the multinational corps may actually facilitate the ease with which nations form future coalitions. An example of a coalition is the coalition of international forces which formed to push Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. The multinational corps system was formed as a result of an allied decision. The multinational corps may, however, have an effect of the formation on future coalitions, ad hoc in nature, for the attainment of future objectives.

Command and Control. There are four terms that are very important to understand when dealing with command and control of allied or coalition forces. They are: Operational Control (OPCON), Lead Nation Command, Parallel Command, and Combination Command.

Operational Control, using the NATO definition, provides the gaining commander the authority:

> to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location, to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of these units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistical control.[35]

The US forces which take part in the multinational corps work exclusively using this command relationship.

The multinational corps system also functions under a concept called "Lead Nation Command." Using this concept, the "nation providing

the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force."[36] This concept fits almost all of the multinational corps except the EURO and GE/DA (JUTLAND) Corps. These two corps have completely integrated staffs with rotating national commanders.

Each Corps in which the United States takes part also functions under a Parallel Command. A Parallel Command allows forces to be "aligned in common effort, each retaining national control" or retaining command while "permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force."[37] Therefore US forces participating in the multinational corps system use a combination of "lead nation" control while retaining national command. This combination should not be confused with the term, Combination Command.

Combination Command "occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces."[38] An example of the Combination Command can be taken from Desert Storm where western nations were aligned under US control and Arab national forces were aligned under Saudi control.

Consideration of the command and control means and an understanding of how each relationship is defined is critical to understanding exactly how the multinational corps system works and what advantages, disadvantages, and consequences participation in the multinational corps have. These terms define a set of very specific responsibilities for the national and multinational corps commander.

Understanding key terms and definitions is important when discussing allied or coalition forces. These terms and their definitions often form the basis upon which multinational forces are fought, controlled, and organized. In relation to the multinational corps system, these terms have long been part of an over-arching NATO

doctrine which attempts to smooth the problems that normally arise when two nations must conduct operations under a common multinational or other nation command. The definition of these terms did not, however, just occur. These terms have been developed, to a large degree, through the experience of nations conducting warfare or training as part of alliances or coalitions over time and especially since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

Determining the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of participation in the multinational corps system is extremely important. The multinational corps system was formed almost purely out of the political realities that arose after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. In consideration of these realities, the system must, as its mission, continue to provide NATO the military means to ensure the security of its member states while pursuing the long-standing goal of establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.[39] It is critical, then, that the US Army concentrate on maximizing the combat potential of these multinational organizations because an organization that is ineffectual could lead to a needless loss of American lives and is certainly nc deterrent. Consequently, a historical review should establish principles from which to judge the military value of the multinational corps or at least to highlight issues that must be addressed. An examination of the multinational corps system, and specific US participation therein, will provide the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences from involvement in the multinational corps system. Finally, the consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system may provide advantages from which lessons can be reaped to make future coalitions, in which the United States may participate, more successful. For despite an

abundance of US wartime experience with coalition warfare, "not much of an effort has been devoted to preparing forces for the possibility of coalition war in future conflicts."[15] The importance of this topic will then be judged in number of lives lost or success gained with US forces engaged as part of an allied or coalition force on future battlefields.

CHAPTER 2

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The history of the twentieth century gives insight into the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of the NATO multinational corps system overall and specifically US participation within the multinational corps system. The multinational corps system is a new concept, training combined formations at corps level in peace with no defined threat. However, alliances or coalitions formed to deter or defeat a common threat are nothing new in history. In fact, the twentieth century alone is replete with examples of nations fighting as members of coalitions or formal alliances. One of the first conflicts of the twentieth century, the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, was put down by a coalition of the United States, Germany, France, England, and Japan "when the Chinese government seemed unable or unwilling to contain the Boxer threat to the legations in Peking."[1] World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and Desert Storm are just the major instances within the twentieth century in which nations have put forces side by side to impose their strategic will upon another nation or nations. Another conflict which mirrors the multitude of minor multinational coalitions involved in resolving international crisis is the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro in 1913 in which a naval coalition attempted to force the two warring powers to cease hostilities. "All forces were of an ad hoc variety, and based on the existence of common interests between the participating powers."[2] The US participated as a minor or leading power in each of these coalitions. Therefore an analysis of what has been successful or unsuccessful in forming these

coalitions or alliances should yield principles by which the potential success of a multinational formation may be judged.

In order to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of combined operations overall, it is important to analyze coalitions and alliances from a historical context. A logical starting point from which an analysis of coalitions or alliances within the twentieth century can be begun is a short examination as to why nations have conducted combined warfare in the past. This examination should also include some of the overall advantages and disadvantages of conducting combined warfare. This examination will be followed by an analysis of four conflicts, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and Desert Storm to determine common principles which have guided the success or failure of these combined operations. These principles, will provide insight and criteria from which to judge the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of participation in the multinational corps system.

The United States, like many nations which participate in coalitions, does not participate "for reasons of friendship or good will but for reasons of self-interest--usually that of self-protection."[3] In the past nations have, more often than not, been driven to combined warfare as a result of "an intense and direct threat."[4] Such a threat is normally required for nations to act in unison. The lack of this direct threat has also weakened alliances.[5] While nations participate in alliances and coalitions largely for reasons of self-interest, nations form coalitions or alliances and achieve unity within the alliance or coalition "through strongly shared collective and national objectives."[6] The combined force acquires certain advantages, disadvantages, and or consequences which lead to greater security for

the participating nations and fulfill their individual objectives of self-interest or self-protection.

Nations gain several advantages through participation in coalitions or alliances. These advantages, which a coalition or alliance receives in the pursuit of national security objectives tend to be largely strategic in nature. These advantages define how the nation gains legitimacy, greater resources, greater ability to deter, and economic advantage through an alliance or coalition.

The first advantage, and most important in US use of coalition warfare in the post-World War II world, is legitimacy. Alliances or coalitions provide a certain degree of shared legitimacy for each state involved. "There is a need for political and public legitimacy which coalitions and alliances help create, . . . [in which nations will] seek allies to justify their use of force."[7] Certainly the United States strove to gain legitimacy in pursuit of strategic objectives through building a multinational force to eject Iraq from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm.[8]

Nations also gain advantage through the use of coalitions as they "provide sufficient power to resist or carry out aggression."[9] This power consists of military or economic resources which may provide greater manpower or industrial raw materials or manufacturing. World War I demonstrates this strategic advantage probably better than any other. The Allies of Britain and France needed an infusion of manpower to achieve success on the battlefields of France. Joffre, leader of the French mission to request US entry into the war, placed his appeal bluntly: "We want men, men, men."[10]

Nations may acquire an advantage from a coalition or alliance in gaining a deterrence from attack from collective military security. They "make known to potential adversaries an alignment of powers as a

form of deterrence."[11] The NATO alliance, whose basic threat is that "an attack against one is attack against all,"[12] is perhaps the most successful example of an alliance formed as a successful deterrent.

A final advantage that a nation may accrue from participation in an alliance or coalition is an economic one. Generally, it is cheaper to participate in an alliance in which several nations share the economic burden of participation. NATO is and to a degree the Warsaw Pact was, an example of smaller nations gaining the economic advantage of participation with superpowers as part of a defensive alliance.[13] However, even the larger nations benefit from the relief that a group of smaller nations bring to an alliance. The United States would have had to considerably expand its national military resourcing in order to man the German frontier and wage war in Korea without the military resources that the nations of the UN provided.

Nations do gain distinct advantages through participation in a coalition or alliance. These advantages are largely strategic providing legitimacy, greater resources, greater ability to deter, and economic advantage. As states have entered alliances to gain the strategic advantages inherent to allied or coalition operations they have also incurred several disadvantages at the operational or tactical level of war.

Historically, there have been some very distinct disadvantages to conducting allied or coalition warfare. As the advantages of a combined operation tend to the strategic so then the disadvantages tend to the operational or tactical side of a military coalition or alliance. In end effect, "a combined operation is never likely to achieve the same amount of combat power as a strictly national operation."[14] Differences between nations involved in the coalition or alliance "continually beset

every combined operation to the detriment, not the enhancement, of combat operations."[15]

The first and greatest disadvantage of coalition warfare is incurred when the common objectives or national interest which bind allies or coalition partners fall apart. Even slight deviations in national objectives at the strategic level of war can degrade combined operations in support of over-arching strategic objectives. "Any multi-state coalition is unwieldy and fragile. Areas of commonality binding members together are usually less than the policy differences which remain."[16] These problems are certainly not new. The war theorist, Karl von Clausewitz writing after the success of the "Grand Alliance" against Napoleon, suggests that "among alliances the center of gravity lies in the community of interest."[17] Failure to protect this community of interest could allow an enemy to drive a wedge into the unity of an allied force and degrade operations. An example of this problem can be drawn from the Korean conflict in which "many coalition partners were determined to keep the war limited and vigorously protested anything done without full consultation . . . ."[18] During Desert Storm, "each Coalition member made individual political decisions as to what extent they would participate in implementing the UN Resolutions."[19] In both conflicts, this forced tactical or operational decisions into the political arena, degrading the commander's ability to react quickly. Finally divergent allied or coalition member objectives can force combined operations to last longer in that varying interests make it also inherently more difficult to make peace.[20] Varied strategic interests are magnified at the operational level when a commander must somehow take the varied forces in his command and wield them with some form of unity of purpose. Historically, dissimilar national strategic

objectives are a distinct disadvantage to conducting combined operations.

Another disadvantage arises from varied tactical doctrines and capabilities within combined forces. US Major General Waldo G. Freeman stated in his assessment of the challenges of combined operations that:

> Doctrinal differences, if not known and accommodated, can be like grinding gears when attempting to link allied forces operations. Accommodating differences is not easy, but must be done.[21]

In the Korean Conflict, "coalition forces retained idiosyncrasies that were disruptive to operations."[22] The French disliked marching at night, the Turks would not march in dispersed columns but would march in closely packed columns.[23] In World War I, the French had problems with the British doctrinally in that the French Officer was given a great deal of latitude in tactical decision making while the British officer was not. Therefore friction resulted when a French Officer felt over supervised when working with the British and the British Officer seemingly floundered for lack of clear and exact guidance when working for the French.[24] Differences in doctrines result therefore in a disadvantage which can greatly limit the effectiveness of the combined force.

Another disadvantage to conducting combined operations results from differences in language within the combined force overall, and more specifically from using a different military language. Naturally, language is a problem that could be solved with translators. However, accuracy is extremely difficult to obtain as the military language functions as a language within a language and can create confusion on the battlefield. This problem is magnified when communication systems are also difficult to mesh. Even among English speaking allies, "there is a high potential for misunderstanding, and the difficulties which can arise due to miscommunication are potentially disastrous."[25] In NATO,

where military terms are a well-defined language, limitations continually arise because documents and terms must still be translated for dissemination to subordinate national units. "This takes time from planning and there is a high potential for mistakes or misunderstandings in the process."[26] Within the coalition or allied environment "commonality of allied understanding requires linguistic and military technical vocabulary not normally appreciated in a purely national force environment."[27] Therefore differences in language or misunderstandings can be fateful. An example of this problem can be taken from the Korean Conflict in which the Turkish Brigade, after defending heroically at Kunu-ri was unable to ask for assistance and directions back to the US lines because of a lack of interpreters within the UN force. This failure to communicate caused the US forces to "assume the Turks had fled; instead of promptly sending a relief force, the Americans had written the Turks off as lost" with tragic results.[28] Language can be a significant disadvantage to the operational or tactical success of a combined force.

A final disadvantage to conducting combined operations arises from incompatible logistic systems and equipment interoperability. This problem has consistently bedeviled even in the most long standing of allies. NATO has seen incompatible logistics as such a problem that NATO has relegated logistics to a purely national responsibility except in combat emergencies.[29] "Ad hoc coalitions with non-traditional allies create a logistic problem all the more complex."[30] This problem did not significantly impede the combined forces in World War II or Korea "because of the overwhelming presence of American material and weapons."[31] Among all of the allies in World War I, logistics and equipment interoperability became an obstacle as "the number of allied nations, the numbers of widely separated theaters of war, and the nature

of fighting produced complications and difficulties which no one had foreseen and for which no one was prepared."[32] Logistic system compatibility and equipment interoperability is then an important disadvantage to fighting as a combined force.

There are, then, several historical disadvantages to conducting combined operations which strike directly at the operational or tactical capabilities of a combined force. Problems in disjointed national interests, doctrine, language, incompatible logistic systems, and equipment interoperability can create significant difficulties in the conduct of successful combined operations. These disadvantages can, of course, be overcome to a degree. However, forces participating in combined operations must perform at enhanced levels in order to overcome these disadvantages and form an effective fighting force.

When nations have weighed the advantages against the disadvantages of conducting combined warfare they have opted for the advantages. Nations have historically chosen to fight as a member of an alliance or coalition and attempted to ignore, reduce or circumvent the disadvantages of fighting as a combined force. Historically, because nations have typically not carried their knowledge of combined operations over from one conflict to another, the initial costs have been high. Forces have, nevertheless, overcome these operational disadvantages to conducting combined operations, gained the advantages pursuant to conducting combined operations and have accomplished their national objectives.

Because nations have consistently decided to gain the advantages of combined warfare and attempt to overcome the disadvantages, it is possible to examine how nations in the twentieth century have overcome or reduced the effect of the disadvantages of combined warfare at the operational or tactical level. The AEF in World War I, the US forces in

World War II, the UN Forces in Korea and the Coalition Force in Operation Desert Storm can be used as case studies to determine how the allies in these conflicts successfully or unsuccessfully overcame the disadvantages to conducting combined operations. These case studies will then provide criteria from which to judge the probable advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of the NATO Multinational Corps and perhaps even future coalitions. The "Gulf War has reconfirmed that, as in the past, future regional wars will again be fought not only as a member of a coalition, but probably with non-traditional allies."[33] Therefore, "lessons learned" in how to reduce the effect of the disadvantages of conducting combined operations at the operational or tactical level may reduce or negate similar problems in future conflicts.

World War I:

The political reasons for the US entry into World War I in 1917 are many and varied. They range from the most significant, Germany's sinking of US merchant shipping involved in the war trade which had sprung up between the United States and the allies, to the abhorrence of German war atrocities.[34] For whatever national interest the United States entered World War I, the US entry demonstrates the impact of the strategic advantages and operational disadvantages of conducting combined warfare.

The advantages in US participation were largely strategic in nature. Specifically the United States provided the strategic advantage of resources, raw materials, and manpower, to the alliance.[35] The United States, hopelessly unprepared militarily for war, gained the strategic advantage of a militarily smaller nation fighting in combination with nations which were experienced and equipped to fight a major war against an experienced and well equipped enemy.[36] Therefore,

the United States entered into World War I as a member of an alliance to achieve its national objectives and accrued the strategic advantages which fighting as a member of a coalition or alliance offered.

The disadvantages which resulted from disjointed allied interests, doctrine, language, incompatible (or nonexistent) logistic systems, and equipment interoperabiltiy were all present in the US Army's attempts to operate with both the British and the French forces. The operational disadvantages, though immense, were reduced or nullified by the allies in order to attain the strategic advantages which the alliance offered and ultimately achieve the allied strategic objectives.

Though aligned in a common effort to defeat Germany, and recognizing the need for US manpower to accomplish that end, the American, British, and French military leaders were not aligned on how that manpower would best be employed. There was a divergence in interests. In fact, "US interests were at odds with the coalition" over the issue of the independent employment of US troops.[37] The British and French, upon examining the preparedness of US forces, saw the degree of training that had to be achieved in order to place US units in the line. They felt that US forces would best be used as individual replacements. They would thereby gain the immediate impact of US troops in the trenches and thus best serve French and British interests.[38] The US leadership and in particular their Commander, General John J. (Black Jack) Pershing had other ideas. "Convinced that American character was different from European character and that public sentiment and national pride would never allow service under a foreign flag, General John J. Pershing demanded his own piece of the front" and independent command of US forces.[39] This principle guided Pershing throughout the war and he was given the specific authority in his orders from the Secretary of War, Newton Baker to

> cooperate with the forces of other countries employed against that enemy [Imperial German Forces]; but in so doing, the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved.[41]

While these orders were very specific, the United States recognized that this principle could not be applied without the flexibility to ensure success in combined operations. Therefore General Pershing was given the additional guidance that

> this fundamental rule [of separate employment] is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. . . . You will exercise full discretion in determining the manner of cooperation.[41]

Consequently, although the United States refused to absolutely align its interests with the allies in the manner in which US troops were utilized, the problem was nullified to a degree by giving the US commander, in theater, the prerogative to employ troops outside of the specific US requirement for the "independent employment" of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Pershing did indeed stubbornly cling to his instructions. However, he also utilized his discretion and cooperated where and when necessary. He did, when needed, grudgingly allow US forces to fight under allied command and "American divisions did remain with and fight under the command of allied generals in several instances."[42] This authority allowed the commander to ensure the success of the larger US objective--to defeat the Germans--when US interests conflicted with the allies on how US manpower would be employed.

The problem of divergent national doctrines and capabilities between the AEF and her allies was a disadvantage in conducting combined operations in World War I. This problem was, nevertheless, quickly overcome. Because the US Army was so ill-equipped and trained to conduct operations on the scale necessary for them to succeed on the western front, the United States adopted, to a large degree, allied (in

particular French) equipment and tactical doctrine. In fact as the United States mobilized, the French and British sent over 700 officers and noncommissioned officers to "give instruction in the new weapons and techniques of trench warfare."[43] US artillerymen were issued and trained on the French 75mm Howitzer.[44] US divisions, such as the 1st Division, were adopted by a French unit cadre as they arrived in theater, trained and slowly introduced into a quiet sector of the line under French operational control.[45] In addition to adopting allied doctrine, problems with staff organizations also forced Pershing to adopt French staff methods.[46] While the AEF did almost fully adopt French tactical doctrine and equipment, they did so with a bit of resentment toward their allies. This was because the

> French, with whom the bulk of the AEF was attached for training, regarded them as green troops, suitable only for garrisoning trenches, to free the more tactically minded French to act as assault divisions.[47]

The AEF experience influenced many US junior officers serving during World War I. Many of these officers serving in senior positions during World War II ensured that America would not be in the same situation that the AEF was in, in 1917. General Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939, seeing the war clouds gathering once more in Europe, began to immediately prepare US units to fight in Europe. Marshall began to ensure that "another AEF would not be dependent on its allies nor would its operations be subordinated to their chosen strategy."[48] Also Pershing, as a measure of independence from the British and French influence and "a lack of satisfaction with French dominance" continued to insist on the primacy of open warfare in US thought and training.[49] This US doctrine was almost completely abandoned after the appalling loss of US life at Catigny in May-June 1918 in execution of this doctrine.[50] Therefore, the disadvantages which divergent national doctrine and capabilities create were

nullified, to a large degree, through combined training in like equipment prior to US introduction into the combined warfare environment. As a consideration it should be remembered, however, that wholesale adoption of equipment and doctrine could lead to national resentment among the coalition partner(s) being equipped and trained.

Language was also a problem between the allies in World War I. Like many of the disadvantages of conducting combined warfare, the problem of language, whether common or military technical, was never completely solved by the allies. Sir Frederick Maurice writing on the experiences of the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army in 1914 indicated that language and common operational methods plagued the two armies:

> The tactical cooperation of armies operating in the same theater of war proved to be a more complicated and difficult business. It had not been foreseen that British and allied troops would for so long periods be holding lines defensively side-by-side, that they would be constantly relieving each other; nor, that their operations, whether in offensive or defensive battle, would have frequent reactions not only on the plans of the commanders but on the troops in the front lines.[51]

Maurice goes on to state that the British and French reduced the impact of this problem through the use of operational liaison teams at each others headquarters. This notwithstanding, Maurice adds that, if it had been possible to "make arrangements for cooperation public before the war, a good deal might have been done than was done to educate our army in the French systems and methods."[52] Therefore education and training in methods and terminology could have assisted in solving the problem of language between the French and British.

The problem of language existed equally between the AEF, the British and French. Language problems were a constant source of friction throughout the war. The problems with the British seemed to be worse than with the French. As a US Commander of a Supply Company of the 78th Division working with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)

noted, "a foreign language doesn't cause as much irritation as your own language spoken differently."[53] Problems such as the British habit of calling railroad cars, trucks, and the British tendency "to avoid technical terms and constantly use initials utterly unintelligible to the Americans also complicated matters."[54]

Nonetheless, overall, the AEF's prior training with the British and French produced "qualified, trained, language proficient liaison officers that possessed the confidence of their own commanders."[55] These liaison officers, who were known by the commanders and staffs to which they were sent, reduced the impact of language differences on the AEF's combined operations. Liaison and prior combined training was then paramount in reducing the operational or tactical disadvantage that a difference in languages caused when conducting combined operations in World War I.

Incompatible logistics systems and equipment interoperability were not much of disadvantage in the conduct of AEF operations in World War I. The problems of logistics and equipment interoperabilitiy were largely solved as "it was understood from the beginning that as much of the material required for the AEF as possible should be acquired in Europe."[56] Therefore the AEF was equipped with French Hotchkiss machine guns, Chauchat automatic rifles and "enough 75's [French 75 millimeter Light Howitzers] (1828 in all) to equip the AEF."[57] The AEF also leaned very heavily on French munitions for support of these weapon systems. In the end, much of the AEF's logistic support and equipment came from a French or British base. For example four American divisions came under the control of the British starting in April 1918. The "British equipped these soldiers, fed them, and trained them . . . ."[58] Therefore the disadvantage of dissimilar logistics doctrine and

equipment interoperability was largely nullified by the AEF being almost fully supported through either the British or French systems.

The need to fulfill national interests prompted US entry into World War I. The decision was also made to enter the war as a co-belligerent of the multinational force facing the Germans, thereby gaining the strategic advantages of conducting allied or coalition warfare. While the disadvantages of differing objectives, doctrine and capabilities, language, logistics system, and equipment interoperability existed for the AEF in the conduct of combined operations, these problems were largely overcome by almost complete adoption of French or British tactical doctrine and equipment. Above all, the AEF was trained extensively in this new doctrine and with their new equipment prior to being introduced and while moving into the theater of operations. This training allowed the AEF to integrate as successfully as possible with their allies. Prior training, then, was paramount to counteracting the disadvantages of conducting combined warfare in World War I. Also important was the complete re-equipping of the AEF with common allied equipment which eased considerably the interoperability problems associated with combined operations at the tactical and operational level of war.

World War II

The United States, although much better prepared both militarily and industrially than they had been entering World War I, entered World War II with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a part of a greater alliance from which they acquired several strategic advantages. The strategic advantages gained from conducting combined warfare in fighting the Germans and Japanese were essentially resource and economic in nature. Although the US had essentially already begun to mobilize its industrial base to support the British prior to 1941, the United

States needed what the French and British needed in World War I, the resource of manpower and the economic advantage of participating in an alliance that was large enough in military strength to successfully wage war against the Axis powers.[59] "Thanks to the huge accession of manpower and supplies, the prospects of the anti-Axis alliance suddenly grew brighter" when the United States entered the war against the axis powers.[60] The British and the Russians obviously gained the economic power as well as the manpower and industrial resources that the US formal entry into the war provided and expanded. Therefore, the United States entered the war in 1941 and gained the strategic advantages that participation in an alliance or coalition afford.

The United States gained the same disadvantages in conducting combined operations that they had identified and successfully addressed in World War I. The United States did recognize the operational or tactical problems of conducting combined operations prior to the war. They however, failed to apply the lessons which the AEF learned in combined operations during World War I. In fact, Major General Fox Connor, Eisenhower's mentor, in a 1939 address to the US Army War College stated that:

> dealing with the enemy is a simple and straightforward matter when contrasted with securing close cooperation with an ally. By the same token no small part of our War College studies should be devoted to an endeavor to foresee exactly what to expect and how to reduce a friction should we have Allies, which may God forbid, in the next war.[61]

Unfortunately as may be inferred from the date that MG Connor gave this address, 1939, the United States did not use the inter-war years, 1918-1941, to their advantage to develop better methods to counter-act the problems of conducting combined operations. This failure to prepare was not American alone. The French and the British armies also failed to use the inter-war years as well as the extensive time they had during the "Phony War," from September 1939 to May 1940,

to prepare for combined operations.[62] Therefore, the Allies entered World War II no better prepared to counter the disadvantages of combined operations than they had been ready to conduct combined operations in 1917. The combined operations of World War II exhibited the same operational and tactical disadvantages in conducting combined warfare that had been discovered in World War I. The Allied forces went about the same costly process to address and negate the effects of divergent interests, differing doctrine and capabilities, different languages, and dissimilar logistic systems and equipment.

Combined forces in World War II suffered, in many instances, from divergent national interests. Though there was agreement on the need to defeat the Germans and the Japanese, and even that the Japanese or Asian theater should hold second place to the defeat of Axis powers in Europe, the method by which this goal was accomplished came into conflict on the operational and strategic level. The Allies, in fact, changed their operational strategy on several occasions, not only because of the fortunes of war, but also because of the changing dominance of its members. "These positions were governed by the outlook each held toward the other."[63] The war's strategy was reflected by the degree of influence that each nation had at the time and was a result of the combined "directness of Americans, the cautious British approach, and Soviet bluntness."[64]

A divergence in allied interests and trust was reflected from the strategic level down to the operational and tactical level in the conduct of combined operations during the war. For example, divergent national objectives and bias were a contributing factor to the failure of the first and only combined corps operation during World War II, Operation Shingle, better known as the Anzio landings.[65] Although the United States felt that the Anzio landings should be a nationally pure

operation for many reasons, to include the fact that the operation had to be planned and executed in less than a month, 25 December 1943 to 22 January 1944, British national interests effected this operation at the tactical level of war and resulted in it becoming a combined corps operation.[66] Churchill prevailed upon the allied staff to ensure that British troops; although not present in the numbers necessary to conduct the operation alone, took part in this operation. Churchill felt that British troops should take part because the operation was planned as part of the "indirect approach" strategy of the British and because he felt British troops must be in on the capture of Rome.[67] Thus, the mission was given to the VI (US) Corps with one British and one American Division under the command of Major General John P. Lucas.[68] Lucas' already difficult mission was further complicated when he received conflicting guidance on some of the specific objectives of the operation from his British superior, General Sir Harold Alexander and his US superior, General Mark Clark. Alexander told Lucas to capture the key Alban Hills, Clark told him not to do so--Clark did this without consulting Alexander.[69] Therefore, divergent national interests and objectives at the allied strategic level of war which were reflected down to the operational and tactical level of war slowly doomed the mission to failure.

The VI Corps Commander, Major General Lucas, could have identified the problem and rescued the situation but did not. Because of a national bias, Lucas almost single-mindedly avoided dealing with his British superiors or subordinates and therefore did not report a divergence in his orders. Lucas failed to take steps to address the problems arising from a divergence in national interests and objectives as they effected his mission. Additionally, because of Lucas' national bias in dealing with his subordinates, he failed to build a cohesive

combined force and establish unity of effort during the operation.[70] Therefore, unlike Pershing in World War I who had the latitude and desire to subordinate the problems which grew from a divergence in interests and objectives to the interests of achieving unity, the commanders involved in Operation Shingle did not overcome national bias nor did they address problems which arose from a divergence in national interests and objectives. After Operation Shingle, the allied senior commanders, Alexander and Eisenhower, sought to negate the problem of divergent interests and objectives as they effected military operations. They especially looked at the personalities of the commanders involved in allied operations. Those commanders who proved intractable in working with allied elements in their predominately national commands, were replaced "before their presence destroyed interoperability."[71]

Combined forces in World War II did experience a difference in doctrine and capabilities which was a constant disadvantage in conducting combined operations. Doctrinal problems were both external, between allies, and internal, within each army, which further exacerbated the problems when conducting US/UK operations.

External differences in British and US doctrine created confusion and induced uncertainty and misunderstanding between allies conducting operations. For example, the United States used a very open orders planning conference where options were discussed by the commanders. The British, received their orders at a division briefing with little discussion. During Operation Shingle, the US method of issuing orders led the British division commander to an impression that the US VI Corps command was "ambiguous and indecisive" when the US force was simply following US doctrine.[72] This caused the British commander to distrust his senior US commander and his staff. In another example, the combined staff of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander

(COSSAC), a British officer, experienced many "clashes of personality" which had their foundation in national differences. It did not "take long to realize that the American and British lines of approach to a military problem, as in so many things, were 180 degrees apart."[73] Further, there was a difference in orders formats which were for the British more restrictive than US. The external problems were normally overcome with combined training, experience, and the use of integrated staffs such as the COSSAC. As the war progressed, however, the internal problems which induced friction both externally and internally in combined operations were not so easily overcome.

A lack of defined British or US internal maneuver warfare doctrine impacted on national and allied operational cohesion and further complicated combined operations during World War II. For example, Patton commanding the 3rd Army under US control, considered Bradley and Eisenhower too cautious and not fully grasping armored warfare.[74] Bradley thought "Patton . . . had a rudimentary conception of tactics . . . simply a process of bulling ahead."[75] All considered Montgomery overly cautious and methodical in his execution of combat operations, "coalition warfare never his strong suit."[76] Montgomery felt that "Americans were complete amateurs at fighting."[77] These perceptions bred distrust and contempt between allied and national units and between national and allied commanders.[78] There was simply no defined doctrine, either US or British, for conducting maneuver warfare. Consequently, there was no doctrinal base upon which to reconcile different national tactical methods within a combined force. Therefore clashes of personality and a lack of defined national doctrine further exacerbated problems when units conducted combined operations. The Allies understanding this problem, sought constantly to relieve the tensions between commanders and their staffs at the combined level by

following the precepts laid out in the Allied review of Operation Shingle. That was, to avoid allied integration at below corps level when possible and to segregate by national sectors.[79] As the war in Europe went on, more than anything else, experience in dealing with each other fostered trust and smoothed out the problems and disadvantages assessed when working together. The cost for this experience was high and potentially disastrous as during Operation Shingle.

Language differences did not play a significant role as a disadvantage in allied operations during World War II.[80] This was because the allies early in the war ensured communications between each other with liaison teams. The liaison teams also brought with them the ability to transmit orders efficiently over their own national equipment in their own military technical language.[81] Even in the 15th Army Group fighting in Italy, which consisted of Americans, British, French, New Zealanders, South Africans, Poles, Indians, Brazilians, Italians, Greeks, Moroccans, Algerians Arabs, Goums, Senegalese, and a brigade of Jewish soldiers, the language problems were overcome and their "record of victory . . . remains as a testimonial to their bravery, team spirit, and cooperation."[82] Even with the problems of a multitude of languages, the allies within both theaters counted on effective liaison teams to avoid any major problems and they successfully negated the disadvantage different languages created in conducting combined operations.

Incompatible logistic systems and the lack of some interoperable equipment was also a disadvantage to units executing combined operations during World War II. Though increasing the difficulty of operations, these problems were overcome by three factors, increasing commonality of equipment, integrated staffs, and dedicated national sectors. First, problems were reduced because weapon systems were initially predominately US or British and later overwhelmingly American.[83]

Second, differences in logistic systems, such as the great difference in how replacements were calculated and prepositioned, were largely solved by integrated staff logistic planning.[84] For example, during Operation Shingle, members of the British staff element of the combined "US" Fifth Army staff were assigned to the VI Corps staff to assist in easing national logistic and interoperability problems. This "addition of experienced British officers . . . constituted a welcome reinforcement to the hard-pressed corps staff" and contributed to relieving the problems in planning and coordinating combined logistics.[85] Third, despite the relative success of logistics in the Anzio landings in Italy, the remainder of the war in Europe was to be characterized by the assignment of national sectors for logistics except in emergencies. For example, during Normandy invasion planning and execution "each ally was to have his own supply line and thus their own harbors."[86] The British and like equipped forces were assigned a sector on the east closer to the supply base in England whereas the United States had the sector on the west so that they could break their supply link from the British Isle and receive supplies directly from the US."[87] Therefore the problems of combined logistics--although a disadvantage at the operational level--was reduced through the predominance of US equipment and material, combined staff planning, and the assignment of national sectors and supply lines of communication (LOCs).

The United States entered World War II as part of the Alliance and gained the strategic advantages that an alliance provides. The United States also accrued the same disadvantages to conducting combined operations that they had experienced in World War I. These disadvantages were in the same areas of: diverging interests, incompatible doctrines and capabilities, language difficulties and incompatible logistic systems, and equipment. In almost every case the

problems were addressed through combined training and experience in working with each other. Logistic problems were solved through common equipment to provide common logistics, combined logistic planning staffs, and/or national logistic sectors providing sole national logistical support such as the system set up in the Normandy invasion. Problems of diverging interests were solved through ensuring that the commanders on the ground were dedicated to making the combined team work. The Allies weeded out those leaders that, because of a nationalistic bias when conducting combined operations, consistently compounded the problems of combined warfare. Unfortunately, these problems were solved not in peace, but in the middle of combat operations where inexperience is the most costly, in failed operations, and lives. Therefore the US experienced the same problems in conducting combined operations that they had experienced during World War I. The US also overcame or reduced the detrimental effect of these problems in many of the same ways as they had in World War I in order to maintain the alliance and therefore continue to acquire the strategic advantages of conducting combined operations.

Korean War

The United States entered the Korean War in June of 1950 as the lead nation of a UN force in order to defeat the communist North Korean attack into South Korea. The United States provided over 50 percent of the ground force and over 85 percent of the air force to a 22 nation coalition committed to defending South Korea.[86] The United States was capable of achieving its security interests in combination with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. Nevertheless, the United States opted to fight as a member of a larger coalition. The United States needed the strategic advantage of legitimacy which the UN coalition provided. "Early on it was determined by American leaders, for both domestic and

international reasons, that the conflict be supported by more than just the United States and South Korea."[89] The other 20 nations participated for other differing strategic advantages. South Korea, more than all the other nations, needed desperately the resource and economic advantages which the UN force provided. All of these nations while accruing the strategic advantages of a coalition force, assumed the operational and tactical disadvantages as well.

The formation of NATO and the experience that the Western nations of France, Britain and the United States gained throughout World War II certainly benefited them when, within five years from the end of World War II, they were plunged once again into combat as members of a combined force. However, overall, the UN still had to overcome many of the same disadvantages of conducting combined operations which the US, Britain and France had experienced when fighting together in both World Wars I and II. These problems were further exacerbated by the diversity of the force and the relative small tactical units that each nation, outside of the United States and South Korea, supplied.[90] The effects of the problems caused by diverging national interests, incompatible doctrines, a multitude of languages, and incompatible logistics systems and equipment will now be analyzed in detail.

The members of the UN Coalition experienced the same problems of diverging strategic interests that degraded combined forces at the operational and tactical levels of war in both World War I and II. While the nations which sent ground troops to defend the ROK as members of the UN Coalition entered in agreement to support the UN Resolution to defend South Korea against North Korean aggression, their specific interests diverged at the strategic level enough to create problems at the operational and tactical level. For example, while the UN force drove the North Korean Army back out of South Korea after the Inchon

invasion and the Eighth Army offensive, coalition governments began to diverge as to whether or not to continue across the old demarcation line and reunify Korea.[91] South Korean President, Synghmon Rhee and, ultimately, the United States, pressed for elimination of North Korea and reunification. Both Britain and France pushed for maintaining a limited war with limited objectives.[92] This divergence in interests caused nations to place conditions on the coalition operational and tactical commanders. For example, some nations denied their pilots "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft across the Chinese border, when such action had already been approved by the lead nation commander, GEN Douglas MacArthur. These nations also insisted that they be consulted before the UN took actions that they thought might be provocative and lead to an escalation of the conflict. Failure to solve this problem caused tension between the nations of the coalition and effected how these units operated on the ground.[93] These problems, like those of World War I and II, were eventually solved by national commanders who recognized the constraints placed upon them and cooperated to use their forces to maximize their ability to achieve the overall coalition goals. Therefore diverging strategic interests, like in World Wars I and II, had a negative impact upon combined operations, complicating how forces fought to achieve the combined forces' strategic goals.

Like the problem of diverging interests, the difficulties of integrating incompatible tactical doctrines and capabilities was again a disadvantage to conducting combined operations in the Korean War. For example, as in both World War I and II, the still incompatible British and US orders and planning systems caused friction and misunderstanding between these coalition partners.[94] This difference in doctrine led to a difficulty in exchanging British Commonwealth and US sectors throughout the war.[95] As another example the Philippine detachment--

despite experience in working with the US in World War II and having an abundance of combat experience--also had command difficulties that arose from dissimilar command philosophies. These differences led to such a level of non-cooperation between the commander of the Philippine unit and UN forces that eventually the UN requested the Philippine commander's relief. "Subsequently, the American leadership agreed that a more formal reception and an orientation training facility would have prevented this problem" and they formed the UN Reception Center (UNRC).[96] "The UNRC services ranged from brief indoctrination to major unit training" prior to a coalition unit conducting combined combat operations.[97] The UNRC was to "standardize and train UN forces along US doctrinal lines."[98] Only the British Commonwealth troops, presumably because of nationalistic reasons, did not pass through the UNRC. Commonwealth forces were provided similar common doctrinal training in their own reception and training center.[99] The UNRC did reduce the problems the combined force had because of dissimilar military doctrine and capabilities and "some significant shortcomings were resolved before they led to tragedy."[100] The US did, then, eventually reduce the problems that dissimilar national military doctrines and capabilities cause in the conduct of combined operations. They did this through gaining experience in working together and through common training at UNRCs.

More than perhaps in both World Wars I and II, language problems were again disadvantages to the conduct of operations in Korea. Early in the conflict, General MacArthur standardized the UN Force language as English. Consequently, the burden to provide enough English speakers fell upon the nations providing the force as all orders were published in English. The tragic results of the failure of the Turkish Brigade to have the necessary English speakers and its failure to be able to

communicate with their US headquarters during the battle of Kunu-ri has already been highlighted. This example certainly illustrates the problems with MacArthur's policy, especially when "the variety of languages taxed the liaison system" as it did.[101] Also the lack of translators within the entire force placed an "undue burden on the multilingual force and hampered its training and operations."[102] Experience, however, between the US and the British Commonwealth forces in World War II did reduce the problems of dissimilar military English and reduced problems between staffs in the execution of operations.[103] Also, the UNRC provided incoming units with some grounding in US military terms and definitions which assisted these units in overcoming language problems. The close liaison, so effective in both World Wars was, however, ignored and certainly caused problems that could not be resolved before tragedy struck. Therefore as in both World Wars, and to a greater extent, language was a distinct disadvantage to conducting combined operations during the Korean War.

The disadvantage of dissimilar logistic capabilities and equipment was again a disadvantage to conducting combined operations in Korea it had been in the previous two wars. The UN force had to contend with three different logistics systems during the Korean War: the US system, the British system, and the South Korean system.[104] Using the experience of World War II and the idea that logistics remain a national responsibility, these systems operated to a degree independently. Although technically independent, the United States still supplied the bulk of the equipment to the South Korean forces and many of the non-Commonwealth nations. The British supplied the equipment for the Commonwealth nations.[105] The administration of the system was extremely difficult and it was not until the summer of 1951, a year after the conflict began, that the coalition worked out how supplies would be

controlled and accounted for. However, "keeping track of what individual coalition partners used remained a significant burden to the quartermasters, since units attached to US formations drew supplies from their common [national] sources."[106] The system of equipping groups of allies with like equipment and then supporting them from a common national logistic base while very expensive, especially for the US who was not to receive reimbursement from Britain for their US equipment until 1964, solved many problems.[107] The UNRC and the Commonwealth training camps also assisted nations in gaining familiarity with their new equipment.[108] Therefore logistical problems never became crippling, although some remarkable challenges were overcome."[109]

The Korean War also serves as a model which again illustrates that despite the disadvantages of conducting combined operations, these disadvantages can be overcome or at least reduced. The problems of diverging interests and their impact on combined operations were partially overcome during the Korean War as they were in both World Wars I and II by the commanders cooperating within the limitations or constraints their nations imposed upon them to achieve the higher strategic interest. When they would not or could not cooperate, the contributing nation removed them from command. The problems of dissimilar doctrines were also solved through training, in this case provided by the UNRC or Commonwealth Reception Center, or through combat experience. Language obstacles were also partially overcome through the creation of a standard or common theater language and training in that language within each UNRC. However the UN force did not develop liaison to the same high level of effectiveness attained in World Wars I and II. Finally, The UN force overcame the complexities of dissimilar logistic systems and equipment in the same manner as they were overcome in both World Wars I and II. The problems were solved through supplying common

equipment to large portions of the troops, in this case US or British, and thereafter ensuring monitored national logistic resupply from the source from which each unit drew its equipment. Consequently, the Korean War again suggests that the disadvantages of conducting combined operations can be overcome or at least, mitigated. However, like the previous World Wars, this was accomplished at great risk and loss of life until the coalition could determine ways to overcome these disadvantages.

The example of the Korean War, like World Wars I and II, suggests that nations will conduct combined operations to acquire strategic advantages despite the operational disadvantages. The United States and the other coalition forces fought in Korea for very specific national interests. They fought as a member of an alliance to achieve advantages like additional resources or economic assistance that another allied nation provides, like South Korea, or they participate in combined operations to achieve a perceived legitimacy for their actions like the United States. These advantages far over-rode the disadvantages of diverging interests, dissimilar tactical doctrine and capabilities, different languages and dissimilar logistic systems and equipment. The Korean War also suggests that in the span of thirty three years since the United States entered World War I, that these disadvantages and the impact they have had on combined operations have not substantially changed from conflict to conflict and are independent of time and to a degree, technology.

Desert Storm

Operation Desert Shield/Storm is the latest example of large scale coalition warfare which reinforces three conclusions about the nature of coalition warfare which the analysis of World Wars I, II, and the Korean War also afford. First, despite the difficulties of

conducting combined operations at the operational and tactical level of war, nations will always deem to fight as a combined force to gain the strategic advantages of fighting as part of an alliance or coalition. Second, combined forces accrue the same disadvantages of conducting operations at the tactical and operational levels of war which result from diverging national interests, different national military doctrines and capabilities, different languages and dissimilar logistic systems and equipment. Third, Desert Shield/Storm also reinforces the idea that any coalition can overcome or reduce these operational and tactical disadvantages. They can do this through integrating commanders with the authority to put aside national differences and cooperate within the limits set upon them to achieve the common combined objective. They can overcome doctrinal dissimilarities by conducting combined training before actually entering into combined combat operations and by integrating operational staffs. They may also surmount the difficulties of dissimilar logistic systems and equipment through integrating logistic staffs, assigning national logistic sources and through equipping forces with as much common equipment as possible. The combined operations of Desert Shield/Storm once again illustrate the findings gleaned from the analysis of combined operations in World Wars I , II, and the Korean War and will furnish criteria from which to assess the probable success of future coalitions.

US participation in Desert Shield/Storm again demonstrates that nations will accept the operational disadvantages of fighting as part of a combined force in order to acquire the strategic advantages of fighting as part of a coalition. When Sadam Hussein crossed the border into Kuwait in August of 1990, he probably had no inkling that his actions would provoke the formation of a coalition of the size and strength not seen since the Korean War. Iraq's invasion caused the UN

to condemn Iraq (UN Resolution 660), then embargo Iraq (UN Resolution 661), and then authorize the use of "all necessary means" to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.[110] The invasion caused the formation of a thirty-seven nation combined force in order to enforce the UN Resolutions.[111] While united in supporting the UN resolutions, the United States entered this war in order to achieve US national security interests and entered into the coalition to bolster the legitimacy of US actions. While the United States had the capability, it was not prepared to handle the problem unassisted. "In this politically sensitive area of the world [Southwest Asia], unilateral US action could easily be interpreted as western domination."[112] Therefore despite the power to act unilaterally to achieve her aims, the United States accepted the problems of coalition warfare at the operational and tactical level of war in order to gain the strategic advantages of fighting as a member of a coalition force. From the US point of view, "the recent Gulf war has reconfirmed that, as in the past, future regional wars will again be fought not only as a member of a coalition, but probably with non-traditional allies."[113]

The US forces involved in coalition warfare while gaining national strategic advantages also accrued the same disadvantages. First, diverging interests effected operational and tactical decision making. For example, "each coalition member made individual political decisions as to what extent they would actively participate in implementing the UN Resolutions."[114] This effected how the commander could or could not use each force. Second, the coalition forces had some very basic differences in military doctrine and planning. For example, Syria and Egypt used predominately Soviet-style tactics, while the United States, Britain, and France used the framework provided by their cooperation in NATO to produce a nearly common tactical doctrine.

Third, the United States had to cooperate with 37 other nations that spoke about that same number of different languages and/or dialects. Also, US forces had to integrate dissimilar logistic systems and equipment. The problems ranged from unique ammunition, to specific dietary preferences, to differing levels of logistic resupply methods and procedures.[115] Therefore Desert Shield/Storm shows that the same disadvantages in conducting combined operations that existed in World Wars I and II, and the Korean War are present in every large coalition and are independent of technology. The methods for solving these problems seem to also transcend time and technology.

The coalition forces in support of Desert Storm overcame the problems of conducting combined operations in many of the same ways as the allies of World Wars I and II and the UN forces of the Korean War. In order to overcome the problems which diverging interests cause in a combined operation, the coalition forces developed a parallel command structure with Arab nations working under the control of Saudi Arabia and western forces working under the control of US forces.[116] Operational issues that resulted from disjointed national interests were then surfaced through the two parallel staffs and worked out in an integrated staff called a Coalition Coordination, Control, Communication, and Integration Center (C3IC). This center "coordinated and integrated the theater level coalition forces' defensive and offensive war fighting capabilities" and facilitated and synchronized operations.[117] Also, the two combined commanders ensured a coequal and cooperative relationship existed between the two combined staffs where "trust was ingrained by continual and mutual exchange of information needed to ensure the success of both US and Saudi fighting forces."[118] This parallel command system was different from the single supreme commander concept used in World Wars I, II, and the Korean War.

However, the C3IC did provide a similar degree of unity of command. The formation of the C3IC does illustrate that the leaders of each national contingent must have the flexibility to identify problems and be prepared to do everything they can to preserve the coalition before interests diverge and threaten the common combined objective. Therefore diverging interests can be overcome through integrating staffs in order to anticipate and reduce the impact of problems and through ensuring the commanders which command each national force are prepared to cooperate with the other forces of the coalition and have the flexibility to employ their troops to ensure the operational of tactical success of the combined force.

In order to reduce the problems which result from dissimilar military doctrines, the coalition ensured units conducted extensive training prior to the conduct of operations and that they integrated staffs at all levels. For example, when the British 1st Armored Division was placed under the tactical control of the US VII Corps problems were slight. This was because of the framework for conducting combined operations built through training as a part NATO and because any differences beyond this framework were mitigated through sufficient time to train for and rehearse the operation prior to the conduct of combined combat operations. Finally the British were fully integrated into the VII Corps staff as a result of a significant British liaison team.[119] At the operational level, problems that resulted from a differences in national doctrine and capabilities were solved through the integrated US and Saudi staffs of the C3IC. The US further integrated British, French, and Australian Staff officers within the US Joint Operations Staff to ensure synchronization of operations and accommodation of differences in these nations and US military doctrine.[120]

US forces conducting combined operations as a part of Desert Shield/Storm solved the problems which different languages cause in much the same way as they were solved in World Wars I, and II, and partially solved in the Korean War. First, due to the fact that more of the force spoke English than any of the other languages of the coalition, "the common language was quickly determined to be English."[121] Also training was conducted for Saudi officers in order to ensure that beyond normal English, that these personnel could "recognize and understand common terms of reference-in this case, the technical language of war."[122] US military personnel with foreign area experience also served as translators to ensure orders and documents were translated "so that their real context and meaning could be explicitly understood."[123] Finally liaison teams were provided down to maneuver brigade and battalion level--largely through the use of Special Forces Teams--to ensure the complete understanding of orders and to serve as additional communications links.[124] Therefore the use of a common defined language, training in the technical military language and an in-depth liaison system overcame the problems different languages impose upon combined operations as they were overcome in World Wars I, II, and partially the Korean War.

Desert Shield/Storm again illustrates the success of using the same methods to overcome dissimilar logistic systems and equipment that the allies and coalitions of World Wars I, II, and the Korean War had used. Logistics in Desert Storm were largely remained a national responsibility.[125] Shortfalls in equipment were then provided from a common source. In this case a US source, which would then continue to supply that item from its national source in theater.[126] Also a combined staff was created for logistic planning at the C3IC and its two subordinate headquarters, both US and Saudi, to ensure coordination and

smooth integration of logistics systems. Above all, the combined logistics of Desert Shield/Storm "benefited from several unique advantages, including time [before commencement of combat operations], a US built infrastructure, generous Saudi funding, and a predominately US effort . . . ."[127] Therefore the same means for overcoming the obstacles of dissimilar logistics and equipment which were used in World War I, II, and the Korean War were also effective for the combined forces of Desert Shield/Storm.

The combined forces involved in Desert Shield/Storm, like the forces involved in World Wars I, II, and the Korean War, acquired disadvantages in the conduct of combined operations at the operational and tactical level of war. These forces also overcame or reduced the deleterious effect of these disadvantages in similar ways. The problems of diverging national interests were overcome by commanders of national forces who were willing and had the authority to cooperate with the commanders of the other forces to achieve the common coalition goals. The C3IC's integrated staff also identified possible fissures in the coalition's interests and solved them before they impacted upon the combined force. Doctrinal problems were solved through combined training, experience in working with each other and again, through the use of combined operational and tactical staffs. Language problems were solved through determining a common language, using well qualified and trained translators, providing language training, and most of all, through using well equipped, trained, and trusted liaison teams that were distributed down to the lowest level. Dissimilar logistics systems and equipment problems were solved through the assignment of logistics as a national responsibility, through establishing a common equipment source and--most important of all--through establishing combined logistic planning and management staffs. All of these problems applied

to each of the forces involved in conducting combined operations at the operational and tactical level. Each force throughout the period examined from 1917 to 1991 also mitigated or nullified the effect of these problems in many of the same ways.

The examination of the major combined operations of World Wars I, II, the Korean War, and Desert Shield/Storm does give insight into the potential efficacy of the Multinational Corps System and provides a method to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in NATO's multinational corps system. The case studies show that the United States and other NATO nations involved in the Multinational Corps System have demonstrated a willingness to participate as part of a combined corps to gain the strategic advantages of legitimacy, greater resources, greater ability to deter and an economic advantage. The case studies also reinforce the assertion that NATO nations will participate and conduct operations as part of the multinational corps to gain the strategic advantages that coalitions provide despite the operational and tactical disadvantages and difficulties which the case studies have shown all coalitions forces accrue. The case studies have also described common methods in which coalitions can negate, or at least mitigate, the disadvantages of conducting combined operations. These methods serve as the basis for criteria to evaluate the probable success of a multinational corps in the conduct of combined operations and to determine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation as a part of a multinational corps. These criteria are:

1. How well does the command and control structure negate or reduce the impact of divergent national strategic interests in the conduct of combined operations?

2. Does the training cycle provide the framework for gaining experience in conducting combined operations and are the staffs integrated to the degree that differences of national military doctrine and capabilities do not reduce the combined forces' combat effectiveness?

3. Does the training cycle and unit structure promote the overcoming of language differences through providing a common language, qualified translators, well equipped and trusted liaison teams down to the lowest levels?

4. Does the multinational corps structure and command relationships provide for integrated logistic staffs, and the ability to obtain common supplies or at least assure ease of national logistic support in order to overcome differences in logistic systems and equipment?

5. Does the NATO multinational corps provide a framework for gaining experience in the building of ad hoc coalitions with non-traditional allies independent of the multinational corps system?

This chapter suggests that there are a number of common conclusions about the nature of combined forces and that there are criteria from which to judge the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of the multinational corps system. These criteria can be used as a set of analytical tools with which to evaluate the effectiveness of the Multinational Corps System overall and the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system.

CHAPTER 3

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS SYSTEM

In order to fully consider the advantages, disadvantages and consequences of US participation in the multinational corps system it is important first to analyze the NATO multinational corps system itself. As a part of this analysis it is necessary to first examine the background and missions of the multinational corps system overall and the corps in which the United States participates in particular. Next, it is reasonable to utilize the criteria developed from the analysis of the coalitions of World Wars I and II, Korea, and Desert Shield/Storm to evaluate how well the multinational corps system addresses the obstacles associated with combined operations and whether the system then provides any advantages or creates any disadvantages for a combined force. This analysis of the multinational corps system is intended to highlight the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of the NATO multinational corps system altogether. The analysis will also serve to judge the probable success of these corps in the fulfillment of their missions.

Background and Missions of the Multinational Corps

A multinational structure within NATO has existed since the foundation of the alliance. Forces during this time fought predominately within national sectors which the Commander of Allied Forces Central Region (AFCENT), General Hans-Henning von Sandrart, called a "'layer cake' disposition of forward-deployed national corps and divisions in Germany."[1] NATO blended forces predominately at

operational and strategic level. They thereby avoided many of the problems of combined operations while continuing to benefit from the strategic advantages that the alliance offered. Exceptions to this fundamental rule were tactical relationships such as the US VII Corps' operational control of the 12th German Panzer Division in the Cold War general defense plans. These relationships were limited by time and mission and were "accomplished on a smaller scale than anticipated in future multinational formations."[2] In short, NATO continued to function based on the lessons learned during World War II. These lessons dictated that forces remain nationally pure at the tactical level of war--corps and below--with nations fighting within distinct geographic sectors under national command. This structure provided what Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, commander of the US VII Corps in 1989-1991, described as sectors which "should somehow isolate allied formations from the uncomfortable strain of multinational operations and the heaviest demands of genuine interoperability whenever possible."[3] This NATO structure was to change in 1989 with the fall of the "Iron Curtain."

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact changed NATO's "layer cake" approach to war-fighting. NATO nations without a distinct and looming threat felt the need to reduce forces overall and reduce the number of troops within the NATO Central Region. The disintegration of the more predictable and defined "Soviet threat" also created a requirement to have smaller, more mobile forces available to conduct "operations in contingency situations, unrelated to the classic East-West scenario" which could demonstrate NATO resolve.[4] The NATO nations wanted to continue to gain the strategic benefits of the alliance, maintaining prepared forces in Europe, while reducing their military strength. Therefore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union

and the Warsaw Pact caused NATO to adopt a new strategy. NATO formally announced this strategy after the 1991 Rome Summit. The strategy

> provides for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and major changes in NATO's integrated military forces, including substantial reductions in their size and readiness, improvements in mobility, flexibility, and adaptability to different contingencies and greater use of multinational formations.[5]

These changes caused NATO to adopt a tiered approach to the fielding of NATO forces discussed in chapter 1. NATO relies on multinational forces for the first two tiers, Rapid Reaction Forces and Main Defense forces. This places a requirement on what the AFCENT commander described as "mobility at all levels and . . . the need for interoperability, standardization and the ability to sustain multinational operations."[6] In short, the nations of the NATO Alliance radically departed from the lessons learned during World War II and former NATO doctrine. As a V (US) Corps spokesman put it, "no one country can go it alone now, so we might as well work better together.[7] The fall of the "Iron Curtain" has, then, forced the NATO nations to form the alliance around both the resource and economic strategic advantages that the alliance has to offer. The change in the NATO strategic environment also forced NATO to rely on multinational forces at the operational and tactical levels of war, the multinational corps.

In response to the new strategy, NATO formed six multinational corps. NATO formed one Rapid Reaction Corps consisting of a variety of division and brigade sized single nation units and five, two nation, Main Defense Corps. The missions and readiness of these corps vary based upon which NATO force tier they serve. For example, the Allied Command Europe's Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) serves as the only NATO rapid reaction force and has a very versatile mission. The ARRC has the mission to deploy rapidly as a credible military force" capable of a multitude of missions from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to .

. . defense in the old sense of a conflict."[8] The ARRC may deploy with its full contingent of nations or may deploy with just a few of its divisions. Significantly, NATO can employ the ARRC either inside or outside the NATO Area of Responsibility as in its current role as part of the NATO ground Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.[9] The Main Defense Forces, the other five multinational corps (main defense corps), have a slower mobilization time depending on each national division's designated readiness, approximately six months to one year.[10] These forces are also "expected to be employed primarily in the [NATO] Central Region."[11] There is therefore a great deal of difference in the state of readiness and even the deployablity of the different types of multinational corps depending upon which NATO force tier they serve.

The United States has committed three divisions, one corps HQ, and various corps troops to the NATO multinational corps. At least one division, one FA brigade, and various logistic and medical units (comprising what a corps would normally provide to a division) are placed under the operational control of other than US corps headquarters.[12] These units have the prerequisite forces to conduct operations in accordance with national tactical doctrine "within the frame work of Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 35 and STANAGs [Standard NATO Agreements]."[13] The other division and corps headquarters provide the nucleus around which a German-US Corps is built. One division, 1st (US) Armored Division, is currently dedicated by agreement to support both the ARRC and the II (GE/US) Corps (Main Defense Corps), which is naturally problematic. Also, the US/GE Corps--V (US/GE) Corps--consists of one US corps HQ (V Corps), one US division, 3rd (US) Infantry Division along with the 5th (GE) Panzer Division. Therefore, the United States has committed itself and one-fifth (or one third depending on what additional division the US designates to fill 1st (US) Armored

division's role with the II (GE/US) Corps or the ARRC) of it's ten active duty divisions to multinational forces. It is therefore of considerable importance to examine the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of these corps in which the US participates.

Analysis of the Multinational Corps System

Having examined the background and missions of the NATO multinational Corps, and the US contribution to these corps, it is sensible to next ascertain the benefits, obstacles, and consequences which NATO has accepted in adopting a structure based on the use of multinational corps. Both the ARRC and the Main Defense Corps are subject to the same disadvantages which the impact of possible diverging national interests and objectives, differing doctrine and capabilities, different languages, and incompatible logistics and equipment cause and which have plagued combined forces from World War I to the present. Nonetheless, the NATO combined corps also provide a means for addressing these problems in peace so as to minimize the impact of these problems during the conduct of combat operations. The disadvantage is, then, one of the degree to which the organization addresses these problems. In order to analyze the impact of these disadvantages on the multinational corps system it would be reasonable to use the criteria gained from the historical review of combined operations in World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and Desert Shield/Storm. The result should illustrate whether the multinational corps system, when evaluated against these criteria, adequately addresses the disadvantages and facilitates future successful combined operations.

Using the first criterion developed in chapter 2, the NATO multinational corps command and control structures do facilitate the synchronization of multinational forces and provide a remedy to the problems that divergent national goals may have on these combined

tactical forces. Because of the number of nations in the ARRC versus the bi-national aspect of the GE/US and US/GE corps, these organizations shall be addressed differently.

The ARRC is obviously a very difficult structure with which to conduct combined operations. With a 12 nation mix, the ARRC will pose incredible problems to the commander as he attempts to coordinate and synchronize operations while simultaneously attempting to achieve unity of purpose. Especially in times in which the threat is ill-defined, the commander must satisfy the differing objectives of each national force under his control. This is essentially because "the more coalition objectives differ from those of the other member nations, the more likely a nation will be to withdraw its contribution and membership from the coalition [force]."[14] The ARRC does have an integrated staff to ensure problems can be anticipated and solved before they impact on the operations of subordinate multinational units.[15] Also, since the ARRC is a headquarters established in peace, the commander and staff of the ARRC and other associated commanders and staffs have the opportunity to work together in peace so as to ensure trust and understanding in war. One final and important benefit is that the ARRC is designed with such a large number of associated corps divisions, ten altogether, that at least some of the nations which make up the ARRC will provide enough forces for the ARRC to deploy as an effective force. Nonetheless, despite the ARRC's mission and organization, gaining allied consensus quickly may call the "rapidity" of an ARRC deployment into question. It is almost impossible to predict "whether Alliance members will agree to participate in the deployment of a multinational formation [and] will always remain unknown" for any one specific case.[16] Therefore, because of the sheer numbers of different multinational forces that must be available to NATO at a short notice for the ARRC, divergent national

objectives and restrictions are bound to degrade operations and limit the ARRC's use in a contingency role.[17] The ARRC does, however, provide the necessary structure and the added benefit of training and association in peace that have ensured success in the combined forces examined in chapter 2.

The two Main Defense Corps are essentially easier to operate than the ARRC. Foremost, the corps commander must accommodate only two country's interests. Secondly, both the US/GE and the GE/US Corps have assigned twelve permanent (six active and six reserve) "foreign" officers which serve in each of the corps staff sections except the G-1.[18] The staffs are, therefore, integrated to the degree that problems created by diverging interests in the conduct of combat operations can be identified and addressed.[19] Further, like the ARRC, both of the Main Defense Corps have a defined relationship in peace which will ensure that commanders know each other and can be evaluated on their ability to work with allied nations before a problem can cause operational and tactical difficulties. A Technical Arrangement, which formally establishes each corps upon transfer of authority, also allows the combined corps commander to visit and be briefed on training and readiness as well as mandating the conduct multinational corps level training at least annually.[20] Finally the increased time in which both corps have to be combat ready will promote the resolution of divergent interests prior to the unit's introduction to combat.

Therefore, both organizations use the two methods shown by the historical analysis of chapter 2 for reducing the degrading effect of divergent national goals on the conduct of combined operations. The corps have integrated staffs to ensure that they surface problems that will impact on operations. Multinational corps commanders also have the time to demonstrate their ability to adapt to conducting combined

operations and to establish trust and rapport with the different national units under their command. The ARRC is obviously less suited to its mission than the Main Defense Corps.

Using the second criterion from chapter 2, both the ARRC and the Main Defense Corps provide a framework for gaining experience in conducting combined operations. They integrate staffs to the degree that problems caused by differing national military doctrines and capabilities can be solved before the unit is involved in combat operations. As previously mentioned, both types of corps also establish a standard peacetime combined training requirement. Further, NATO doctrine provides ATPs and STANAGs as a framework upon which the corps have built Combined Field Standard Operating Procedures--Policy Papers in the ARRC--with the express purpose to:

> establish uniform standard operating procedures, improve mutual knowledge of capabilities, differences and limitations, reduce coordination requirements to a minimum, and provide a basis for combined peacetime exercises.[21]

Not all of the problems which result from differing doctrine and capabilities have been resolved. However, training in peace is identifying and alleviating these problems. For example, during the first major GE/US Corps exercise "Proud Lion," the corps identified problems with the limitations of the OPCON command relationship with the US Division as defined by NATO. The II Corps Commander related to the Commander NATO Land Forces Central (COMLANDCENT) that the current relationship denies "a flexible task organization and leaves us [II GE/US Corps] with questions on how to concentrate forces in the main effort and how to create reserves."[22] They have recommended that NATO adopt the US definition of OPCON to address this problem in doctrine. Also, the II Corps, which does not have the same capability to conduct deep operations which the US division possesses, modified their doctrine. As part of "Proud Lion," the II Corps established a "deep

operations cell" in order to synchronize this US capability to the benefit of the overall combined force.[23] This addition of the "GE Corps Deep Cell" was a direct result of a previously identified weakness from an earlier II GE/US Corps exercise, "Wackler Schwab."[24] These exercises, although not necessarily completely alleviating the disparity between the doctrines and capabilities of the two national forces, certainly identifies and addresses these problems. The exercises also build an institutionalized level of experience in solving the problems through after action reviews (AARs) and Combined Field Standard Operating Procedures (CFSOPs). The framework of combined doctrine, training experience, and integrated staffs will, therefore, avoid solving these problems while conducting combat operations and afford an exceptional benefit in the conduct of combined operations. This experience also provides a basis for establishing a common language, the third criterion from chapter 2, which will be the next criterion applied to NATO's multinational corps system.

The multinational corps system does provide a training cycle and a structure that will relieve the problems which different languages create within a combined force. NATO has long provided a structure for conducting operations using the standard languages of English or French. However, even with the structure which exists in NATO, "language limitations continually crop up."[25] Both the ARRC and the Main Defense Corps have established CFSOPs or policy papers that deal specifically with language and provide a further definition to English military terms.[26] Further, the US and German officers that are permanently assigned to each Main Defense Corps must speak German (in the case of US officers) and English (in the case of the German officers), so that they can accurately translate the intent of the combined commander to their subordinate "other nation" divisions. Unfortunately, no translation

section exists within the divisions. Therefore, despite a high language capability at the corps level, there exists a continued problem communicating across boundaries. Additionally, liaison teams are not present in enough quantity to provide the reciprocal liaison required by STANAG 2101. Also, despite timely preparation, as identified in the II (GE/US) Corps Exercise, "Proud Lion", the translation of orders took too long and were far too slow in being sent out.[27] This was primarily due to translation difficulties from German to English. Translation of orders has become a training priority within the II (GE/US) Corps. Therefore combined training will continue to address and attempt to overcome translation and liaison problems. In end effect, the multinational corps do have the same difficulties with different languages which have existed since World War I. However, the multinational corps system provides a frame work in peace, during training, to identify and resolve problems prior to entry into a combat zone. This certainly supports the conclusions of the historical analysis of chapter 2, that "units can be trained to work with allies if such is made part of their normal mission, functions and combat organizations."[28]

Incompatible logistic systems and equipment continue to trouble the multinational corps as they have combined operations since World War I. The Main Defense Corps retain the concept that logistic support remain a national responsibility.[29] The ARRC has developed a policy based upon MC 319 which states that the "provision of logistic support remains a purely national responsibility" and the responsibility for support coordination is shared between the ARRC Commander and the national commanders.[30] This system can create significant problems for divisional logisticians. For example, American divisions rely on corps organizations for support and corps must reinforce them with corps

assets to allow them to be self sustaining.[31] Consequently, a US division in the ARRC and in a GE/US Corps may have considerable difficulties. This is especially the case if the "parent" corps is not in an adjacent sector or if the parent corps is involved in a mission other than dedicated support to the US ARRC division. Currently, sufficient assets are not available to provide support both to the corps and an independent division that may be part of another multinational corps.[32] As another example, German divisions are supported based upon a territorial area support concept in which the corps has little involvement. This makes independent, out of area, employment of a division or more than one unit at a time difficult.[33] As a means of negating the effect of logistics and equipment incompatibility the multinational corps do provide for integrated logistic staffs. Also staffs, during training exercises at corps and LANDCENT level, are attempting to provide an answer to these very complicated problems. This is important as without a change in structure, both the US and GE division present a logistics problem that NATO must solve, especially since the United States and Germany provide a force to all of the seven multinational corps. Thus, like differences which have an impact on a combined force such as diverging national interests, dissimilar doctrine and capabilities, and languages; the impact of differing logistics systems is being reduced through integrated staffs and training in peace. However, as in the case of the US and GE divisions, the solution is one of restructuring an entire logistic system. Logistic system incompatibility, then, remains a significant obstacle for the multinational corps to overcome. In end effect though, given a nation's propensity to act as part of a coalition regardless of the operational or tactical consequences, the multinational corps provide a better framework for solving and identifying logistics problems. This is

especially the case when "coalitions with nontraditional allies create logistics problems all the more complex."[34]

The multinational corps do accrue disadvantages. There is no doubt that the "interoperability difficulties as a result of combining dissimilar forces may actually degrade force capabilities as a whole."[35] In spite of these disadvantages, history tends to illustrate that nations will willingly sacrifice force capability in order to achieve the strategic advantages to conducting combined operations. The multinational corps system, as the analysis against the criteria demonstrate, affords a fixed structure in peace that addresses the inherent disadvantages of conducting combined operations in a training environment. Therefore, although the multinational corps do acquire disadvantages, they also address these disadvantages in peace "allowing corps to become operationally integrated in peace as well as war."[36] These combined formations then do afford notable advantages to the NATO nations when conducting combined operations.

Conclusions

Given NATO's new strategy, the multinational corps provide significant advantages in the conduct of combined operations. First, the system addresses almost all of the problems that the historic analysis illustrated as being inherent to combined operations at the tactical and operational level. Second, the multinational corps system establishes permanently integrated staffs that work together, in peace and war, solving, day to day, interoperabilty problems. They also provide a widening degree of experience for all of the participating forces in dealing with differences in doctrine and capabilities, language, and logistics and equipment. Third, the multinational corps system provides a mandatory combined training requirement which is effective in creating a spirit of cooperation and generating an

awareness of obstacles which the corps must overcome. In the case of most multinational units, this training has resulted in the creation of interoperability handbooks and field standard operating procedures. These documents serve to maintain institutional knowledge and ever increase the unit's ability to overcome the traditional obstacles to combined war-fighting. Additionally, this training allows commanders at all levels a better understanding of the personalities of each nation's forces and reduces the problems that diverging national interests and differing doctrine and capabilities foster. Finally, the multinational corps system furnishes the NATO member nations smaller standing forces which still provide the strategic advantages that coalitions provide to nations. They provide what US Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, described as a continued formal alliance structure to respond to ill-defined threats where US-European mutual interests may be threatened.[37] Consequently, the multinational corps system offers very important advantages to ensure the Alliance's capability to achieve mission success. The combined corps reduce the risks and capitalize upon the benefits of a combined force, especially when considered against fighting within an ad hoc coalition with unfamiliar forces.

The multinational corps system provides many forces which--despite the obstacles inherent to conducting combined operations--provide many more advantages than disadvantages. Although the corps exhibit the same disadvantages as combined forces have displayed since 1917, the multinational corps system structurally and operationally addresses these obstacles in peace rather than in war. This does not mean that the multinational corps system have overcome all the obstacles. However, the corps are providing the very important advantage of being able to train together and grow a base of experience that history has shown will eventually mitigate the impact of diverging

national interests, differing doctrine and capabilities, different languages, and incompatible logistics and equipment. The consequence of the multinational corps system is very simple. It provides standing, integrated, and trained combined forces in peace prepared to "demonstrate the [NATO] nations' resolve to maintain a credible collective defense at the operational level and enhance allied cohesion."[38]

CHAPTER 4

AN ANALYSIS OF US PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS

The analysis of the multinational corps system has shown that the combined corps do provide some significant advantages to NATO. Foremost, this system provides NATO with a capability to field multinational tactical forces which have trained together in peace and are better prepared to accomplish alliance military objectives. The United States has already demonstrated a commitment to this system in NATO through providing two divisions, one corps headquarters, and corps troops to participate in the multinational corps system. The previous chapter has shown that the combined corps concept in NATO affords a framework for training in peace so that multinational forces have a better ability to function at the tactical level of war. This is despite the traditional disadvantages of mixing national forces at that level of war. Therefore, when NATO acts militarily as an alliance, the NATO combined corps provide for a stronger and better prepared military alliance.

Les Aspin, former US Secretary of Defense, stated that "we have no arrangements that allow us to determine in advance which nations will join us against certain threats, when they will join, with what forces, and with what missions."[1] In relation to this inability to completely predetermine future threats and allies, does the multinational corps system provide the United States some benefit within and outside the domain of the NATO Alliance against these ill-defined threats? For the United States, what is at issue is to determine what advantages,

disadvantages, and consequences these corps provide to the United States in pursuance of its national security objectives. This is especially important when judging US ability to respond to these "uncertain threats" and its ability to act with both traditional and nontraditional allies in answering these threats. This chapter shall analyze the multinational corps from the standpoint of the current US National Military Strategy. It shall investigate first the advantages--both strategic and operational and tactical; second, the disadvantages, and finally the consequences--both present and future--which arise from our participation in the multinational corps system.

Strategic Advantages

The multinational corps system provides the same strategic advantages which the United States acquired as part of an alliance or coalition in World Wars I, II, the Korean War, and Desert Shield/Storm. First, the multinational corps have allowed the US forces to provide for its security interests with a smaller and less expensive force structure. Therefore, the combined corps provide a resource and economic advantage. Second, the United States, along with the other NATO nations, continues to gain the Cold War strategic advantage of an ability to deter future European threats as a part of NATO through participating in these combined corps. These formations deter through their organization and training in peace, thereby affording a forum for the NATO nations to continue to demonstrate commitment and enhance their military capabilities in multinational exercises. These corps also facilitate achieving a faster degree of consensus on force utilization and present a more formidable NATO force in advance of a crisis. Finally, the combined corps allow the United States to demonstrate the legitimacy of US and allied aims through participating in multinational

formations prepared to act in support of the shared interests of the alliance. The methods with which the US has achieved these strategic advantages are somewhat different from US experience in the past. The United States gains these advantages through greater multinational integration and training within the multinational corps system in peace rather than in combat. These strategic advantages will now be analyzed in greater detail.

The NATO combined corps provide a unique chance for the United States to gain both the economic and resource strategic advantages, which coalitions afford, in peace. The United States has capitalized upon these advantages in its strategic planning. The combined corps afford these advantages in the NATO area of responsibility (AOR) through furnishing a means for the United States, with a smaller force structure, to participate in trained combined tactical forces which are prepared to deploy as a military force to meet both the interests of the United States and our allies in NATO. This is important for the US military as General John M. Shalikashvili, current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlights the following challenge to US forces in the opening of the 1995 National Military Strategy:

> Our Armed Forces must maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies, even as we continue to restructure and reduce the size of our force.[2]

The multinational corps structure provides the United States with one means to lower its military presence in the NATO AOR and increase its ability to focus unilaterally or with other coalitions in other regions. The National Military Strategy repeatedly reinforces and links the need to restructure and reduce the military with the need to capitalize on the military's ability to participate with allies and friends in combined operations in order to off-set a smaller US force structure. The National Military Strategy continues to add that

> our armed forces will most often fight in concert with regional allies and friends, as coalitions can decisively increase our combat power and lead to a more rapid and favorable outcome to the conflict.[3]

The multinational corps system, in addition to providing trained multinational tactical formations within the NATO AOR, facilitates the US Army's ability to act effectively in concert with allies outside of the NATO AOR. The combined corps provide US units with training and a base of experience in coalition operations. As shown in chapter 2, many of the problems inherent to multinational operations transcend both time and technology. Therefore, multinational corps training and experience should assist US forces when forming "ad hoc multinational operations between select alliance members."[4] This base of experience and training will serve to decrease the difficulties encountered at the tactical level of war when select NATO forces are thrown together to react to an extra-regional threat. Consequently, the multinational corps system contributes to US capabilities to conduct multinational operations, thereby allowing it US "forces of sufficient size and capabilities, in concert with regional allies, to defeat potential enemies in major conflicts that may occur simultaneously in two different regions."[5] Therefore, the United States is better able to meet the challenge with which General Shalikashvilli prefaces the National Military Strategy within and outside of the NATO AOR with a smaller US force structure. The United States, then, reaps the strategic economic and resource advantages that participation in the multinational corps system affords. In addition to providing both the traditional strategic resource and economic advantages, the multinational corps system also provides the United States with a greater deterrent in peace and a greater base for consensus for action and legitimacy while the United States continues to reduce its forces.

The US National Military Strategy states that, "US forces overseas provide visible proof of our commitment to defend American interests with our allies and friends world-wide."[6] This "proof of our commitment" is intended to deter any nation that would threaten these US interests and serves to support the legitimacy of US aims in concert with those of its allies. The multinational corps system certainly contributes to this proof of commitment, deterrence, and legitimacy through providing self-contained multinational forces that are trained to respond to threats in support of common allied security interests both within Europe and possibly in areas outside of the NATO AOR.[7] They serve in much the same way as the US division in Korea has served as part of a multinational corps in Korea for several years. They function "primarily to deter . . . and act as a tripwire to involve the US ground forces in combat . . . if deterrence fails."[8] The multinational corps allow the United States a greater ability to deter--along with the other nations of NATO--with readily deployable multinational troops who work and train together. The combined corps also furnish a forum for the United States to continue to demonstrate publicly, with the other nations of NATO, the legitimacy of US and allied aims through exercising their ability to act in unison in support of US and allied interests. These forces habitually demonstrate, and train to improve, the mechanisms which the corps need to use in planning to face a possible threat from both within and outside of the NATO region.

An example of such an exercise in the NATO region, was the recent US V Corps exercise, "Atlantic Resolve." In this exercise the Corps, along with its habitually associated German 5th Panzer Division and other allies, trained to "test the new security environment" and practice both joint and combined contingency--force projection--operations outside of the NATO region.[9] Exercises such as "Atlantic

Resolve" demonstrate the US military's ability to protect its interests along with its allies, and increases deterrence without necessarily forcing the United States to increase its presence unilaterally. Therefore, US participation in the multinational corps allows for greater deterrence and a framework for

> US forces stationed overseas . . . to participate with allies at all levels in cooperative and defensive security arrangements that help preclude conflict and foster the peaceful enlargement of the free market nations.[20]

In summary, the multinational corps system provides the United States significant strategic advantages in the furtherance of its national interests. As shown, the multinational corps system provides the potential for greater manpower and equipment resources as one part of standing and trained combined forces prepared to act in unison. The combined corps also offer an economic advantage through allowing the United States to maintain its ability to react to two near simultaneous contingencies with a smaller force structure than that existing prior to the demise of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the corps offer the United States a greater ability to deter through participating in large standing corps which train and are prepared to respond together against regional or extra-regional threats. This is especially the case as these corps exhibit their ability to project power in achieving common allied interests through training. These multinational corps also provide forces prepared to lend legitimacy to Allied security objectives through demonstrating allied consensus and determination to fulfill allied interests. The multinational corps afford the United States several strategic advantages in providing a mechanism in peace to ensure the United States is better able to meet General Shalikashvilli's challenge with a smaller force structure.

Operational and Tactical Advantages

The strategic advantages which the United States gains from the multinational corps system are significant. They allow the United States to maintain a smaller force structure in Europe and deter in peace based upon a commitment to these standing combined formations. But as shown in chapter 2, that is expected. Otherwise, the United States would not participate in these corps as they would not support US national interests. Of equal significance are the advantages or opportunities that multinational corps provide US forces as a whole at the operational or tactical level of war. The multinational corps will present opportunities for the US Army to nullify or limit the inherent tactical disadvantages of coalition warfare discovered in the chapter 2 analysis of combined operations. The combined corps will afford the United States the chance to train for and perfect combined, tactical operational techniques, tactics, and procedures in peace. Taking advantage of this combined training will present the US Army with a greater potential for future success with our allies and with possible ad hoc coalition partners when acting in support of US national security interests. It is in these opportunities to train that the US gains the greatest advantage at the operational and tactical levels of war from participation in the multinational corps.

As noted in chapter 3, the multinational corps continue to experience the same disadvantages at the tactical level of war which have been common to all tactical multinational forces since World War I. The most significant difference is that the combined corps in Europe have the opportunity to train in peace in order to overcome the obstacles which in the past multinational forces had to overcome while conducting combat operations. The multinational corps also present an added occasion for US forces to gain greater experience within its Army

in conducting multinational operations. In general, the multinational corps training environment is providing the US military with a test-bed for the formation and refinement of US Army combined doctrine. The combined corps are providing multinational staff experience for US Army leaders and forces and are focusing these leaders on finding solutions to reducing the complexities of combined operations. Additionally, US participation within the multinational corps system is providing an opportunity to gain insights into improving US liaison and communications structures to better facilitate the conduct of tactical operations. Multinational corps training is also affording US forces experience in improving their ability to sustain themselves within other multinational formations. They also assist the US Army in understanding how to best plan for the sustainment of multinational forces under US operational control. The combined corps system does this through training for real-world mission requirements and through establishing a mandated training and testing environment. All of these benefits promote both US ability to conduct multinational tactical operations with our allies in these combined corps and improve US ability to rapidly integrate into a coalition force with yet unknown allies or coalition partners. In short, the multinational corps system provides a mechanism which allows the United States to meet the National Military Strategy's requirement for applying "all our strengths with allies and friends to assure stability in a troubled world" and will ensure that a smaller US military is both stronger and more versatile.[11] It is these opportunities or advantages at the tactical and operational level of war, then, that should be examined in greater detail.

In his 1992 dissertation on the challenges of coalition warfare, CAPT Terry J. Pudas stated, that despite all of the US experience in conducting coalition operations "not much effort has been devoted to

preparing forces for the possibility of coalition war in future conflicts."[12] The truth of this statement has changed significantly since 1992. Multinational corps exercises are providing the US Army with significant advantages and opportunities to develop, evaluate and record army combined doctrinal concepts. The US National Military Strategy recognizes this significant advantage for the United States to better prepare for the conduct of operations as a part of these multinational corps in NATO. The National Military Strategy addresses the extraordinary chance which the multinational corps provide to leverage US training with our allies "through frequent exercises and interoperability training that ensures the effectiveness of coalitions both in and beyond the treaty area."[13] The multinational corps training offers the United States the occasion to test concepts and structures and to incorporate these concepts into a body of combined operations doctrine such as FM100-8, Multinational Operations and the Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, projected to be published in final form in late 1996. This advantage provides a possibility to avoid the problems of interoperability which historically "have been solved--when they have been solved at all--primarily through trail and error during actual combat operations over an extended period of time."[14] Exercises such as "Atlantic Resolve," "Proud Lion," and "Cannon Cloud," already mentioned in this paper, are already providing a greater understanding of the difficulties of conducting combined operations and a wealth of information for possible integration into Army doctrine. With US stated reliance upon allied coalition operations to further its national security strategy, "it is essential . . . that the US Army leadership seek and find ways to make multinational formations at corps level a viable and operative part of US Army doctrine and structural planning."[15] Therefore, the multinational corps

system provides an opportunity for the Army to test, modify, and constantly improve a body of combined operations doctrine. This doctrine will provide US forces with an improved understanding of the complexities of combined operations and will assist them in rapidly integrating US forces not only with traditional allies but also with nontraditional allies and coalition partners of the future as well.

In addition to providing an opportunity to test and record combined doctrine, US participation in the multinational corps also affords a notable advantage in the chance for the Army to train a large number of officers and noncommissioned officers in dealing with the complexities of combined operations. US staffs and exchange officers, at division and corps levels, can gain valuable staff experience in solving the complex problems of integrating differing doctrines, capabilities, and objectives in combined forces. Staffs operating within the multinational corps, or its subordinate units, must in their day-to-day staff duties, in preparation for major exercises and in planning for "real-world" contingencies, tackle and solve complicated combined force tactical problems. These problems require close coordination and cooperation between staffs of other nations and an understanding of what problems must be addressed and how they may best be addressed. The NATO combined corps provide a framework for multinational exercises, which "regardless of the size and the units involved, are productive in creating a spirit of cooperation and creating an awareness of interoperability problems."[16] The multinational corps facilitate this spirit of cooperation and awareness with standard exercises geared to challenge a large number of staff officers in solving interoperability problems. These exercises serve to reinforce their need to understand not only their own doctrinal capabilities and limitations but those of the coalition forces as well.

Additionally, US leaders have the occasion to learn that coordination and cooperation are the key ingredients to a successful coalition command. This is where "the personalities of allied military leaders and the problems associated with personal relationships can be one of the greatest challenges of coalition command."[17] With the large number of US staff officers which rotate through these corps, the US Army has an unprecedented chance to increase the professional competence of its officers and noncommissioned officers overall. Also these exercises will identify those leaders who through personality cannot cope with the complexities of coalition operations. This is especially important as the "parochial or nationalistic attitude of a commander will be mirrored by his staff and subordinates" and will lead to disaster in combined operations.[18] The multinational corps then, provide the United States with an extraordinary opportunity to increase the ability for US military leaders and staffs to better deal with the complexities of combined operations both within and outside of the NATO Alliance. This is of special importance given that "militarily, ad hoc coalitions with nontraditional allies more often than not detract and complicate a limited military operation."[19]

Communications, whether through interoperable equipment or through liaison personnel, are perhaps the most essential element in ensuring combined force effectiveness. However, chapter 2 illustrated that interoperabile communications equipment and liaison teams cannot be thrown together overnight to provide effective support to commanders who are attempting to meld a cohesive and effective coalition tactical force. This is especially true with liaison teams, for "a liaison party which is thrown together at the last minute develops effectiveness only slowly, if at all, and the press of operations may not allow a suitable break-in period."[20] Combined communications, whether through equipment

systems or liaison, must become a practiced skill. This is especially true in an army whose military strategy depends on conducting effective military operations with allies at the tactical level of war. Participation in the multinational corps system provides a significant advantage for the US Army in this area.

Multinational corps provide a structure through exercises and training for the execution of real-world missions to ensure that the US forces in Europe have the ability and training to effectively communicate with the forces which participate within the multinational corps. With wide spread dissemination, this benefit could spill over into the entire Army. For example, although the United States has had extensive experience in the realm of coalition operations in the past, when the newly formed ARRC Headquarters began to plan and train for possible contingency mission in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the United States encountered "significant challenges to command and control arrangements."[21] The ARRC overcame these problems through using internal SOPs to simplify command and control terms, to standardize maps, terms, and graphics, and to ensure communication interfaces between coalition forces and training.[22] Had the United States institutionalized some of the lessons learned from its experience with coalition warfare in the past, perhaps US forces could have anticipated and solved these problems in advance.

Benjamin Cooling in his article on the complexities of coalition warfare states that "experience has shown that units trained and equipped for liaison . . . do a better job of working harmoniously with allies . . . ."[23] The multinational corps system provides this training and experience. Additionally the US Army has the capability to disseminate that experience, so that US units unrelated to the multinational corps can use the experience gained through multinational

corps training. They can then use this experience to facilitate the rapid establishment of liaison and communications with one of the current US allies or an ally or coalition partner of the future. As a result of extensive training, the II (GE/US) Corps was quite successful in this area. The II Corps reported in its latest exercise After Action Review (AAR) that the prior training conducted within the multinational corps created "a great consonance in tactics and doctrine as well as a common understanding" between units. The captured and disseminated tactics, techniques, and procedures that made combined communications and liaison work for the ARRC and II Corps, could provide a significant source of information and afford a notable advantage to other US units when conducting combined operations with traditional or nontraditional allies. Therefore the communications and liaison training and "lessons learned" within the multinational corps could provide a tremendous opportunity for the United States to gain experience that could be applied army wide to ensure the smooth integration of US Army units into coalition forces anywhere.

The multinational corps formations afford the US Army with two advantages in the realm of logistics. First, they provide a forum to test and improve US ability to sustain national forces when working within a multinational formation. Second they offer an opportunity for US staffs to gain experience and overcome interoperability problems in assisting in the planning and execution of the sustainment of multinational forces under US operational control. These advantages are substantial for one of the important lessons which the US Army Center for Lessons Learned emphasized from the planning that went into deploying the ARRC into the former Yugoslavia was that

> We [the US] cannot afford to plan and execute unilaterally. Rather, to play an effective role in theater transportation and sustainment operations, we must work in concert with other coalition

forces and gain an understanding of how they sustain themselves and expect to sustain others.[24]

As with the other advantages, the framework for multinational exercises provides the key. In this case, the US force integration into the multinational corps system provides the means, through training, to learn how to best integrate our sustainment operations into those of other coalition forces. For example, one of the objectives of the V Corps Exercise, "Atlantic Resolve," was to test and depict multinational sustainment in a force projection scenario.[25] The exercise provided detailed insights into the need for a better organizational structure and command and control for joint multinational logistics. V Corps staff planners also commented that they required further and more detailed interoperability publications within NATO and a Multinational Deployment Agency to deconflict national deployment plans.[26] Such experiences, problems, and the resulting solutions, when recorded in detail and disseminated army-wide, could not help but improve the Army's ability to become better prepared to participate in multinational operations world-wide. This experience will improve what the Center for Army Lessons Learned called the capability of "transitioning from a national to a multinational logistics operational concept."[27] Therefore the multinational corps system provides a significant advantage in that it provides the US Army an environment in which to plan, train, and gain experience in integrating combined logistics concepts. In consideration of the emphasis which the National Military Strategy places on the conduct of multinational operations, the NATO combined corps provide a means to meet the "challenges inherent in ensuring adequate interoperability of multinational forces which require considerable time, energy, and resources when all but time is in short supply."[28] The multinational corps provides that time.

The Multinational Corps System does furnish the US Army with significant advantages in the fulfillment of the national military strategy with its focus on coalition warfare. US forces which participate in the training and tactical planning in the multinational corps system environment are certainly better prepared to conduct tactical level multinational operations than even those forces which participated in operation Desert Shield/Storm. More importantly, the multinational corps system provides the US Army with the opportunity to develop and test multinational operational and tactical doctrine. It provides staff and leader experience in the integration of their forces or coalition forces into multinational formations. They also afford the US Army the opportunity to structure a communications and liaison system which will successfully support these formations. Additionally, these multinational forces provide the US Army the chance to train for the successful integration of a national logistics system into a multinational formation and provide extensive experience and training for logistics staffs in understanding the logistics systems of other allies. All of these advantages provide the Army a chance to address and negate the traditional disadvantages to conducting multinational operations at the tactical level.

Disadvantages

Despite the advantages which the Multinational Corps System provides the United States at the operational and tactical levels of war, there are disadvantages which the US assumes when adopting a security strategy that is hinged on coalition rather than unilateral action. For the units participating in the multinational corps these disadvantages exist the areas of differing force capabilities and incompatible force structures. The multinational corps system and

training must play a part in alleviating the disadvantages in both areas in order to assure the effectiveness of these units.

First, US forces may have to fight as part of a force in which there is a gap in capabilities between the US force and that of its ally/coalition partner. "Integration of forces may give the commander a capability he did not previously enjoy with solely national forces. Still he may also acquire a liability."[29] For example, the German Army corps and divisions, with whom we participate in two multinational corps, do not have the capability to conduct deep operations. The German Corps also do not have the intelligence assets to collect deep targeting information that a US division would need to conduct division level deep operations. Therefore there is a capabilities gap in what the US division commander can expect of his German Corps in intelligence collection and in the corps' ability to shape the US division's close battle with deep operations. The US corps is degraded by a German division in which there is no capability to conduct deep operations and the US commander is consequently unable to use his capabilities to gain a maximum effect.[30] This problem goes both ways. There are also differences in German and US structures which mean that the German Corps gives up an extremely powerful division and receives a much weaker, in the realm of combat support assets, US division in return.[31] There is, then, a capabilities gap which will probably "beset every combined operation to the detriment, not the enhancement, of combat efficiency."[32] However the multinational corps system through training and organization, without the pressures of combat, will--as shown in chapter 2--lessen the impact of these capability gaps and provide experience to staffs in resolving problems which arise from these gaps in force capabilities. They are however a disadvantage to fighting as a

part of almost any coalition or allied force versus fighting as a nationally pure force.

A second disadvantage to US participation in multinational corps, which has already been alluded to, is one of the weakness of US divisional structure. US divisions are designed to fight as part of a US Corps and do not have the assets without additional support from a corps to conduct operations in accordance with US doctrine within a multinational corps. In fact, in order to sufficiently structure a US division to fight as part of a larger multinational unit, it must have considerable assets from the corps. This is problematic for, in providing these assets, the corps might be weakened to a point to which it cannot accomplish a mission typically assigned to a US corps.[33] This problem is significant, and is being addressed during exercises and the staffs of all three multinational corps are currently working around this problem. The multinational corps accent on this problem may force the United States to alter its divisional and corps structures to allow for independent deployment of a division away from a corps. This may be the solution, especially with our current National Military Strategy's emphasis on multinational operations. Multinational corps exercises, then, may provide the impetus to alleviate these disadvantages to US participation in the Multinational Corps system.

Although national dependence on coalition operations and, therefore participation in the multinational corps system, results in some disadvantages to the United States they are one of degree. The multinational corps do provide a means in peace to identify and alleviate these disadvantages. This is especially the case when the alternative to participating in combined corps is considered. The alternative is to solve these problems as we conduct actual operations with a coalition partner or ally. As shown in chapter 2, the result of

this policy is that of more lives lost due to greater confusion on the battlefield. Therefore, as long as the United States continues to structure its force around gaining the strategic advantages which allied or coalition warfare offers, participation in the multinational corps system provides the best means to train, identify, and solve these problems. These disadvantages, as well as the advantages, yield many consequences for the United States in pursuance of a multinational solution for its security strategy.

Consequences and Opportunities

The multinational corps has very many positive consequences for the United States. First and foremost, participation in the NATO combined corps assists the United States in meeting the challenge of countering two near simultaneous regional contingencies with a reduced force structure, that is trained in the conduct and execution of multinational operations down to the tactical level of war. The other consequences follow if the United States takes advantage from all of the opportunities that the multinational corps system offers. In some cases the US Army is currently taking advantage of these opportunities. In many cases, they are not. This is significant in that these opportunities afford the United States Army a total force better able to integrate itself with coalition forces and succeed in multinational operations. The first opportunity the multinational corps provides the US Army is the chance to establish a body of US combined force doctrine at the tactical level of war. This doctrine would afford forces with little or no experience in integrating themselves into combined forces some guiding principles for successful war-fighting with coalition forces. Second, the combined corps furnish the United States a chance to gain experience in solving problems with non-interoperable structures

and to disseminate this experience throughout the army. Third, the multinational corps afford the Army a forum to test tactics, techniques, and procedures for fighting as part of a coalition force through war-fighting experiments and through applying that knowledge, Army wide, through the Combat Training Center (CTC) Division of the Army Center for Lessons Learned. These are just some of the many possible consequences which the multinational corps offer the US Army to better prepare it for conducting multinational operations. Unfortunately the US Army, in most cases, has not fully exploited the opportunities which participation in the NATO multinational corps provide. Therefore, it is useful to analyze how the US Army might utilize these possibilities to enhance its ability to conduct coalition warfare.

The first opportunity which the multinational corps provides, is the chance to use the experience and training that the US contributions to the multinational corps gain to further develop, test, and perfect US Army Combined Doctrine. The United States has developed or incorporated some doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations. The focus of these manuals, FM 100-8, FM 100-15, Corps Operations, and Joint Pub 3-16, are at the operational level of war-fighting.[34] These manuals are a significant first step in establishing a US doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations. However, as the focus of these manuals is at the operational level of war, they do not fully address the tactical requirements for a corps to accept a coalition force or, more importantly, the requirements for a US division to integrate itself into a coalition force. It is disturbing to note that the new FM 71-100 approved final draft for division operations has incorporated nothing of significance concerning the conduct multinational operations. Major General Waldo Freeman stated in describing the parameters for US combined doctrine that, "within the limits, our doctrine should specify

how we ought to manage the difficulties encountered [when conducting multinational operations]."[35] The US units participating in the multinational corps have already encountered many of these difficulties and resolved many through the use of interoperability handbooks, CFSOPs, and Technical Arrangements. While each of these is very specific in nature, they do provide a format which could greatly assist a division not normally accustomed to conducting multinational operations in integrating itself with a traditional or a nontraditional ally. For example, the 49th Army National Guard Division took the 1st Armored division's place in the II (GE/US) Corps for a recent exercise. They had only enough time to familiarize themselves with the existing Technical Arrangement and the CFSOP. The result was that with very short notice, the "49th did a superb job in assuming the 1AD role and was able to smoothly integrate itself with the II Corps staff."[36] Therefore the US Army could greatly benefit from the experiences of the US participants in the multinational corps in creating combined tactical doctrine. To date it has not.

As with the creation of combined doctrine, the US Army could more fully utilize its ability and current structures to capture the experiences of the staffs and senior leaders of the units participating in the combined corps in Europe. These experiences when taken and disseminated could greatly assist in providing a great deal of information, Army wide, in improving its ability to conduct combined operations. The US Army's structure for "collecting and analyzing field data, and disseminating, integrating, and archiving lessons from Army operations and training events" is the US Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL).[37] Unfortunately, the CALL cannot monitor all activities. Therefore it is incumbent upon those units participating in the combined corps to submit their experiences to CALL for further

circulation.[38] This too has only occurred in a limited fashion to date. The National Military Strategy states that the success of multinational operations hinges on mutual trust, effective communications, interoperability and doctrinal familiarity.[39] The CALL could play a large part in ensuring that what the combined corps in Europe have learned about all four of these items is distributed army wide. This circulation of lessons learned would increase not just the effectiveness of those forces involved with the multinational corps, but the army as a whole. In order to fully capitalize upon its participation in the multinational corps, the Army and the commanders involved in training with the multinational corps must ensure that their experiences are disseminated army-wide for, "it is through the sharing of tactics, techniques (lessons), and information that knowledge truly transforms itself into combat-ready and capable soldiers and units."[40]

As an adjunct to facilitating the creation of US combined tactical doctrine and to collecting lessons learned from the experiences gained from participation in the multinational corps, the multinational corps exercises could furnish the Army a forum to test the tactics, techniques, and procedures for fighting as part of a coalition force. Currently, the V (US) Corps and its subordinate divisions in Germany undergo an intense training period every 18 to 24 months. This training assesses the abilities of their commanders and staffs to execute their mission essential tasks. This program, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), has as its mission to "train AC [active component] and RC [reserve component] corps, division, and brigade commanders and battle staffs to execute their mission essential task list (METL) in joint and combined settings."[41] This program has an immense impact in its ability to influence US Army doctrine as the results and lessons learned during these exercises are archived, analyzed, and disseminated

through the Combat Training Center (CTC) Division of CALL and from there to the Army.[42] Unfortunately, to date, the BCTP has only addressed the multinational aspect of both the V Corps, as the V (US/GE) Corps, and its peace-time subordinate division, 1st Armored Division, as part of the ARRC and the II (GE/US) Corps, in a very limited fashion.[43] Admittedly, it is difficult to have our allies participate in these exercises. However, as multinational operations play such a large role in our national military strategy, a maximum effort should be directed toward allied participation. These war-fighter exercises could serve as a basis to determine how our combined tactical doctrine should look and provide an extremely important test-bed for the tactics, techniques, and procedures that are needed when integrating a coalition force into a US corps or when integrating a US division into a larger allied formation. Therefore, the multinational corps provide a tremendous opportunity to improve US tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting combined operations world-wide. This opportunity too has not been fully exploited.

The multinational corps provide opportunities for the US Army to better prepare itself to conduct combined operations. They provide the Army a basis from which to develop meaningful combined doctrine, an organization from which to collect and disseminate valuable lessons learned from combined war-fighting and a forum to measure, refine, and further disseminate the lessons learned from combined exercises. In short, combined corps training could greatly assist the US Army in bettering its capabilities to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies in concert with US allies or potential coalition partners even as the United States continues to restructure and reduce the size of the US military.

Conclusions

The NATO Multinational Corps system is certainly more than a political formation which serves to buttress our allies in Europe. It is a system which allows the US Army, with a smaller force structure, to fight and win in concert with allies or coalition partners world-wide in support of our national military strategy. The multinational corps provide the United States with significant advantages in accomplishing the US national military strategy. They provide the US Army the ability to train in peace with traditional US allies in order to provide a standing force that has solved many of the problems that have historically plagued multinational forces at the operational and tactical level of war. They also provide the US military with a forum in which the United States can, for the first time, develop, gain experience, practice, and refine combined operational and tactical doctrine. These corps must still overcome some obstacles to conducting combined operations. However, overall, they provide significant opportunities for the US Army to train to successfully, integrate, fight, and win as part of a combined force. The possibilities created through participation in the multinational corps exemplify this quotation from a 1945 US War Department Pamphlet:

> The old saying "live and learn" must be reversed in war for there we "learn and live"; otherwise we die. It is with this learning in order to live, that the Army is so vitally concerned.[44]

The multinational corps provides an opportunity for the US Army to train for the conduct of combined operations, to "learn and live" before US forces ever enter the combat zone to fight alongside current US allies or US allies of the future. If the US must rely upon combined operations to fight future wars or conflicts, as US history over the past one-hundred years and the current national military strategy indicate, then the NATO combined corps are an important element in

training and preparing to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies with a reduced US force structure.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The multinational corps system provides both NATO and the US an expanded capability to field and maintain trained, combined tactical level forces. These forces afford strategic advantages and address operational and tactical disadvantages which have been historically inherent to multinational operations. Additionally, these forces are not formed in the midst of the turmoil and confusion associated with repelling a direct threat. They are formed and trained in peace, being prepared to respond against vague and uncertain threats. The NATO multinational forces also provide what has been called a "peace dividend" in allowing the NATO nations to maintain a smaller standing military coalition structure which is trained and well prepared to respond to NATO's allied security interests. For the United States, the multinational corps could contribute to structuring and training an Army better prepared to fight as part of a coalition and better prepared to support US interests with fewer resources. The training which multinational corps provide is important for the United States. As Walter Slocombe, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated,

> Our own [US] interests, and those interests we share with others, are far broader than the resources that we can responsibly commit alone . . . . This common interest, and our self-interest in common responses to challenges, means that alliances, cooperative defense arrangements, and coalition warfare remain central to our security doctrine. Nowhere is that more the case than in Europe.[1]

The multinational corps system affords a force structure which allows NATO nations to gain what can be called the historical strategic

advantages which combined forces offer. First, the corps provide a resource advantage. They allow nations with smaller populations, a smaller industrial base or a smaller standing military force to act in concert with other nations to achieve common security objectives. Second, the corps offer an economic advantage, the so called "peace dividend," to NATO nations. The smaller force structures which all of the nations of NATO now maintain are certainly allowing some of the NATO nations in economic trouble to divert money from larger "Cold War" type military forces to solve these economic problems. The multinational corps system allows these nations to gain a "peace dividend" while still maintaining their ability to defend their own national security interests as part of a larger alliance. Third, multinational units continue to deter potential challenges from ill-defined threats. NATO military formations, although now smaller, still include forces from almost all of the nations of NATO, and an attack against one remains , as it was during the Cold War, an attack against all. An attack against a formation such as the ARRC would threaten a response with a more robust force structure from all of the nations contributing units to the ARRC. Finally, these corps provide a shared legitimacy which serves to justify the use of force in support of NATO's shared interests. A multinational corps deployment certainly demonstrates NATO resolve to defend its interests. The ARRC's current deployment into Bosnia is an example of the NATO nations demonstrating resolve to support their interests with combined tactical level force in which a majority of the nations are represented. Therefore, the multinational corps provide the strategic advantages associated with coalition warfare in peace while concurrently training tactical level coalition forces to respond against those that would challenge the shared interests of NATO. These corps afford the nations of NATO a standing force structure which is more

effective than a force thrown together, "ad hoc," to respond to NATO's security interests.

The multinational corps provide effective operational or tactical forces which address the disadvantages that the analysis of Word Wars I, II the Korean War, and Desert Shield/Storm have shown afflict and degrade operational or tactical level multinational forces. They address problems created through disjointed strategic interests which may operationally constrain the actions of the combined force. They address the problems created when two armies with different doctrines and capabilities--which to a large degree influences doctrine--clash. The multinational corps also address the problems caused by different languages, both conversational and technical, and the problems which dissimilar national logistics and equipment can cause. The multinational corps address these traditional disadvantages using the methods which the coalitions of World Wars I, II, the Korean War, and Desert Shield/Storm have shown to be effective and which transcend both time and technology to solve the problems inherent to coalition operations. The corps function with integrated staffs. They train and exercise together using a mandated training cycle which builds a base of experience that has proven capable of overcoming many of the obstacles to creating an effective coalition force. Finally, the corps provide a continuing impetus for the nations of NATO to develop a common tactical doctrine and more interoperable structures and equipment. The disadvantage of reduced combat effectiveness due to the problems associated with operational or tactical level multinational forces have not all been solved. The NATO combined corps are, however, identifying these problems and addressing them through accumulating experience and training. Problems which are the result of differing national capabilities and force structures still impede the effectiveness of at

least the combined corps in which the US forces participate. However, the multinational corps are affording a framework to identify, address, and overcome these problems in peace. This is clearly a better alternative than addressing these obstacles as they have been addressed since 1914, under the pressure of combat.

US participation, while perhaps not regionally necessary, is tied to the nation's security interests and consequently to the nation's national military strategy. The US maintains a two-division corps structure in the NATO Central Region and could easily act as a nationally pure corps. Hence, the United States could support NATO Central Region interests without experiencing the reduced levels of effectiveness which tend to be inherent to coalition forces. However, US participation in the multinational corps is derived from the need to support NATO's new strategy as well as the need to focus on multinational operations world wide. The United States thereby gains the strategic advantages inherent to US participation in NATO and concurrently improves its ability to conduct coalition operations in support of the US national military strategy. This is especially important as this strategy is bound to what Walt Slocombe outlined as alliances, cooperative defense agreements and coalition warfare. Therefore US national military strategy emphasizes what the Department of Defense report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the US Armed Forces recommended as an expansion of US--and therefore regional joint military commanders in chiefs (CINCs)--"planning and preparation for coalition operations."[2] The multinational corps provide an opportunity, then, for the United States to increase its capabilities to fight not only as part of NATO coalition or a coalition formed with one or more of our NATO allies, but also with an unanticipated, "ad hoc," coalition.

US participation and training within the multinational corps improves the US military's ability to wage coalition warfare in three very significant ways. The multinational training and staff integration allow the United States the opportunity to develop operational and, more importantly given the increased difficulties of combined operations at the tactical level of war, tactical level combined war-fighting doctrine. This doctrine would provide what General George Decker called a "common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort" when national security interests dictate that a force unfamiliar with coalition warfare must rapidly integrate itself as an effective element of a coalition force.[3] The multinational corps provide leaders and staffs an opportunity to gain valuable experience overcoming the obstacles of coalition operations. These experiences, when shared with the larger Army force, should improve the Army's ability to conduct effective and successful coalition operations with traditional and nontraditional allies. The multinational corps mandated training also affords the Army the chance to develop and test common coalition tactics, techniques, and procedures. All three of these advantages will further the US Army's ability to conduct coalition warfare which the National Command Authority has deemed "preferable" in order to support our national security interests.[4]

There are many valid arguments that could be made against US reliance on coalition operations. However, given the nation's current, and historically similar, focus on fighting in support of US national interests as part of a larger coalition force, participation in the multinational corps presents few truly discernible disadvantages. These corps provide all of the strategic advantages and provide a means to mitigate or negate the obstacles historically inherent to coalition warfare before ever committing that force in a combat environment. The

combined corps' peace-time training identifies and resolves the problems inherent to operational or tactical level combined operations and therefore limits the risk of operational failure when the multinational force is conducting operations. If US units capture training experiences gained while they exercise within the multinational corps, the ultimate consequence that these corps have for the United States is, then, that they provide a more effective total force capable of being rapidly integrated into a coalition force of traditional or even nontraditional allies. This does not mean that the US has fully reaped all of the advantages that these corps provide. As shown in chapter 4, the US has not. The methodology used in this paper does, nonetheless, lead to some conclusions or recommendations that may suggest a way in which the US could fully benefit from participation in the multinational corps in support of its national security objectives. All of these recommendations can be accomplished within the structures which the Army currently uses to develop doctrine, disseminate lessons learned, and evaluate the tactics, techniques, procedures, and trends for improving war-fighting skills.

First, the US Army should consider using the experiences, results, products (AARs, CFSOPs, Handbooks, and Technical Arrangements), and training of the US units involved in the NATO multinational corps to develop a coherent and useful operational and tactical combined war-fighting doctrine. Current doctrine is focused at the operational level and like FM 100-8, Multinational Operations, is too generalized in focus. Combined tactical doctrine should outline not only the difficulties of combined tactical operations but must provide solutions and guides to developing these solutions. This doctrine should also provide input into addressing the structural problems outlined in chapter 4 in which the divisions do not have the structure to fight

independently of a US corps without significant reinforcement with corps level assets. The development of this doctrine will then improve a tactical unit's ability to plan and train for, assess, evaluate, and refine its ability to conduct multinational operations. This doctrine will then further the US Army's ability to rapidly integrate with a known or nontraditional coalition force.

Second, the US Army should focus some of the CALL's collection effort on assembling the experiences of staffs and leaders which have recently participated in the NATO multinational corps environment. This means that Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should focus some effort to assembling and cataloging the experiences of the divisions and corps exercising within the NATO multinational corps structure in a mid-to-high intensity warfare scenario. This also means, that the combined corps integrated staffs and commanders should formalize and submit to CALL what they have learned about combined tactical operations in the form of AARs, CFSOPs, Handbooks, and Technical Agreements. This will aid in the development and improvement of a usable doctrine and would serve to increase the overall awareness of interoperability issues and lead to force structure improvement. Again the result is an Army better able to integrate itself rapidly with both traditional and non-traditional allies.

A third and final recommendation for improving US capability to conduct combined operations is to ensure corps and division level war-fighting training, especially through the Battle Command Training Program, focuses "War-fighter" Exercises on evaluating multinational operations. This focus should not only evaluate how well our corps involved in the NATO multinational corps system integrates a foreign division. These War-fighter Exercises should also evaluate how capable US divisions are in integrating themselves into a combined corps in

which the lead nation is not US. For example, the BCTP would evaluate how capable the 1st (US) Armored Division is when combining itself into an organization such as the II (GE/US) Corps or the ARRC. Such BCTP exercises would provide a test-bed for Army combined doctrine. As all BCTP exercise results and AARs are recorded and disseminated through the CTC division of CALL, these exercises would serve to disseminate these "lessons learned" throughout the Army. These experiences would then be readily available through the Army electronic Knowledge Network. This network includes world-wide unit level automated access to CALL through E-Mail, the CALL Web Site, The Army Document Storage and Retrieval System, and the CALL Database.[5] Therefore the results and lessons learned from multinational exercises would provide a basis to broaden US capabilities to conduct coalition warfare--not just within the multinational corps but US Army wide.

The NATO multinational corps do provide the US Army significant advantages in improving its ability to conduct operational and tactical level combined operations. The advantages and consequences for the units that participate in the corps are clear. These corps allow US units to conduct unprecedented training in peace that will allow the combined corps to gain the strategic advantages and reduce the operational and tactical disadvantages of coalition operations. These corps allow the US the opportunity to conduct coalition operations without the consequences of discovering inadequacies in a combat zone which may result in failed operations and unnecessarily high casualties. If the consequences of this system are fully realized, the Army will be better prepared in the future to conduct coalition operations with both traditional and nontraditional allies, apart from the confines of the NATO alliance in support of the national military strategy. The multinational corps training forum will allow the army expand its

coalition warfare capabilities beyond just the scope of NATO. For, as British Lord Palmerton pointed out to the British Parliament in 1848,

> It is narrow to assume that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy. [There] are no eternal allies, and [there] are no eternal enemies. National interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.[6]

The multinational corps are as much a vehicle to further US capability to wage coalition warfare in support of US national interests as they are an important and viable part of a standing alliance. Perhaps the importance of the multinational corps lies as much in the former as in the latter. The NATO multinational corps are, then, relevant organizations which provide many advantages, few if any disadvantages and which provide the US Army the capability to "learn and live" when, as our history and our current national military strategy suggests, we enter into future combined operations in support of our national interests.

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[10]Johnsen and Young, Planning Considerations, 8-10.

[11]"Technical Arrangement between the Commanding General, V (US) Corps and The Commanding General, II German Corps concerning the Establishment of Two Bi-national Corps Noting the Agreement as of 10 February 1993 between the Commander and Chief USAREUR and 7th Army and the Chief of Staff, Federal Republic of Germany" (Ulm, Germany: II (GE/US) Corps, 9 May 1994), 1.2.1.

[12]"Combat assets and combat support units are concentrated at corps to allow the corps commander to mass fires and combat power at key, but shifting points across the depth and breadth of the battlefield." Johnsen and Young, Planning Considerations, 11.

[13]"Technical Arrangement," 1.2.1-1.2.4. A similar statement concerning the ARRC may be found in the "ACE Rapid Reaction Corps Briefing." 3rd Edition, (Rheindahlen, Germany: HQ ARRC, April 1994), 18-19.

[14]Pudas, 5.

[15]"ACE Rapid Reaction Corps Briefing," 7.

[16]Seitz, 8-9.

[17]Johnsen and Young, Preparing for the NATO Summit, 4.

[18]"Technical Arrangement," 1.2.8.

[19]Pudas, 25.

[20]"Technical Arrangement," 1.5.3.2.

[21]HQ II Corps, "II. (GE/US) Corps, 1st (US) AD CFSOP," Final Draft (Ulm, Germany: II (GE/US) Corps, 7 June 1995), 1.

[22]HQ II Corps, "II Corps CPX 1995, Briefing to COMLANDCENT" (Ulm, Germany: II (GE/US) Corps, 13 September 1995), 11.

[23]HQ II Corps, "II Corps CPX 1995, Briefing to COMLANDCENT," 12.

[24]Tetu, 36.

[25]Freeman, 8.

[26]HQ II Corps, "II. (GE/US) Corps, 1st (US) AD CFSOP," 13.4. Similar information concerning the ARRC may be found in the "ACE Rapid Reaction Corps Briefing," 10.

[27]"Obwohl zeitgerecht erstellt, kamen Befehle häufig zu spät . . . ." HQ II Corps, "Proud Lion Closing AAR (Sclußbesprechung)," (Ulm, Germany: II (GE/US) Corps, June 1995), 14.

[28]Cooling, 42.

[29]"Technical Arrangement," 2.4.3.

[30]"ACE Rapid Reaction Corps Briefing," 15.

[31]Johnsen and Young. Planning Considerations, 11.

[32]Ibid.

[33]The German armed forces have recently adopted a Army Support Command that will simplify the areas support concept at the national level, however, this concept still required further testing as noted in the HQ II Corps, "Proud Lion Closing AAR," 20-22.

[34]Pudas, 14.

[35]Ibid., 13.

[36]Lowe and Young, 69.

[37]Grant Willis, "NATO Asks, What's next?" Army Times 54(9) (27 September 1993): 10.

[38]Seitz, 4-5.

Chapter 4

[1]Willis, 10.

[2]The emphasis on the word "reduce" is the author's. US Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States

of America: 1995, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), Forward.

[3]Ibid., 13.

[4]Gregory, 6.

[5]US Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, 5.

[6]Ibid., 6.

[7]The NATO operations in Bosnia demonstrate a NATO response within the NATO AOR while the deployment of many of the NATO nations in support of Desert Shield/Storm demonstrate the deployment of possible coalitions of common NATO forces outside of the alliance framework and outside of the NATO AOR.

[8]Tetu, 12.

[9]HQ Army Training Support Center and Fort Eustis Training Support Center, "Joint Visitors Bureau Briefing," Atlantic Resolve '94 (CD ROM) (Ft. Leaven worth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Feb 1995), 2.

[10]US Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, 4.

[11]Ibid., iii.

[12]Pudas, 3.

[13]US Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, 10.

[14]Cooling, 40.

[15]Thomas-Durell Young and Karl H. Lowe, The Case for US Participation in NATO Multinational Corps (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, October 1990), 17.

[16]Pudas, 23-24.

[17]Ibid., 18.

[18]Cooling, 40-41.

[19]Pudas, 16.

[20]US Army, FM 100-8, "Field Service Regulation--The Army in Multinational Operations," Final Draft, Unedited (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1995), B-5.

[21]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Lessons Learned Report: Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1995), 92.11.5

[22]Ibid., 92.11.5

[23]Cooling, 42.

[24]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Lessons Learned Report: Bosnia, iv.

[25]HQ Army Training Support Center and Fort Eustis Training Support Center, "Joint Visitors Bureau Briefing," Slide 1.

[26]HQ Army Training Support Center and Fort Eustis Training Support Center, "Initial Impressions Briefing," Atlantic Resolve '94 (CD ROM) (Ft. Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Feb 1995).

[27]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Lessons Learned Report: Bosnia, iv.

[28]Johnsen and Young, Planning Considerations, 33.

[29]Cooling, 42.

[30]This information is taken from the "After Action Review" of the II (GE/US) Corps exercise "WACKLER SCHWAB" as noted in Tetu, 36.

[31]HQ II (GE/US) Corps, "Exercise Cannon Cloud First Impression Report" (Ulm, Germany: Archives II (GE) Corps, 1995), Annex C.

[32]Tetu, 21.

[33]Johnsen and Young, Planning Considerations, 11.

[34]FM 100-8 (1995), 5-1.

[35]Freeman, 10.

[36]Tom Tracey, CPT(P), "Comments on Exercise Cannon Cloud" (Ulm: HQ II (US/GE) Corps, Dec 1995), 3.

[37]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned) Handbook (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1996), 1.

[38]Ibid., B-1.

[39]US Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, 8.

[40]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, CALL Handbook, 2.

[41]HQ US Army Command and General Staff College, C730 Training the Force Advance Book (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, Sept. 1995), 1-81.

[42]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, CALL Handbook, C-1.

[43]The units of the multinational corps have only been addressed in one War-fighter (Feb 95) and in the "Atlantic Resolve" exercise.

[44]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, CALL Handbook, Cover.

Chapter 5

[1]Walter Slocombe, "NATO's Enlargement: Building a New Security System in Europe," in CSIS Report: NATO's Role in European Stability, ed Stephen A. Cambone (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 25.

[2]Department of Defense, Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 2-7.

[3]Ibid., 2-4.

[4]Department of Defense, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1995), 9.

[5]US Army Training and Doctrine Command, CALL Handbook, D-2.

[6]This quotation is taken from Robert Debs Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 8-9.

APPENDIX A

MAIN DEFENSE CORPS

1996



- ★ Each corps is organized and operated IAW agreements between each nation which is represented in the corps. There is no standard NATO relationship.
- ★ The first national abbreviation designates Corps "Lead Nation"
- ★ National divisons remain under national authority until Transfer of Authority (TOA) to multinational command.
- ★ Only the EURO and GE/DA Corps represent permanent multinational staffs. Other corps have a "Lead Nation" staff with a smaller number of permanent "Other Nation Augmentees.

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE) RAPID REACTION CORPS (ARRC)



Notes:

i: MND: Multinational Divisions / FAR: Fuerza de Accion Rapida

ii: The MNDs are OPCOM to the Corps. All other formations are OPCOM or OPCON upon Transfer of Authority

iii: Corps Troops consist predominately of a mix of UK, US, IT, and DA Aviation, Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units

APPENDIX B

V (US) CORPS MAJOR COMBAT UNITS BEFORE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY



BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

There is a considerable amount of literature available which analyses the problems of coalition operations at all of the levels of war, tactical, operational, and strategic. However, there is very little literature available which deals specifically with the formation and experiences of the NATO multinational corps. Therefore, this study is drawn from two general categories of literature. This work has used historical writings dealing with the formation and performance of tactical level coalitions within the twentieth century in order to lay a foundation for the analysis of the multinational corps. These works constitute the first category. The study also uses some of the sources of literature which deal with the new security environment created when the Soviet Union began to openly fall apart in 1989. These sources constitute the second category. This essay will analyze the state of the literature in these two categories.

There are quite a few works which examine the performance of coalitions in the twentieth century. Of all of these sources, the works written about five to ten years after the event seem to be the most revealing. Works such as Sir Frederick Maurice's book, Lessons of Allied Cooperation: Naval Military and Air, 1914 - 1918 and Wayne Danzik's article, "Coalition Forces in the Korean War" are outstanding examples of a detailed examination of coalition operations. Works such as these provide an objective approach to the topic once time and politics no longer play a role in how an author shapes his view of a coalition so as not to offend or threaten a present alliance or

criticize a close international friendship. Written in 1942, Maurice's book is a very frank account of coalition warfare in World War I. Maurice, in his work, counsels the then growing Anglo - American alliance in World War II on the challenges to meet and methods to overcome these challenges when executing combined operations. Danzik's article, written in 1992, is also written with a view to providing lessons learned about the obstacles with which tactical level combined forces must contend. He wrote his work in view of the expanding number of tactical level combined operations in which the US seems to be participating. There are many primary sources, however, because of the highly political nature of their comments or criticisms, most are classified and not usable for a writer who is writing an open work on the problems of coalition warfare.

There are also many other works which analyze combined operations which were written close to the completion of the conflicts. These works are, however, somewhat suspect. For example, those works written immediately following World War II and during the Korean conflict seem to be written with the thought of bolstering the idea that combined operations are fairly problem free in order to support one nation's participation in NATO. The works such as British Colonel G.R.D. Fitzpatrick's article, "Anzio and Its Lessons" (1950) and US LTC Wilson J. Johnsten's article, "Combined Operations in Lower Units" (1952), seem to discount the problems of combined operations in order to bolster the perceived strengths of participation in NATO or in the Korean Conflict. This work has, therefore, attempted to use historical sources which were written from five to ten years after the conflict being analyzed. Also, this work has used with caution the sources which have a certain political idea to further. This study has used these sources only if their facts can be verified with primary source journals

or after-action reviews. Therefore, there is a large amount of literature which examines the challenges to conducting effective combined operations. However, the author's motive and the time-frame in which he is writing may must be taken into consideration.

The second category of works which this study has used are those which examine the use of multinational corps as an answer to the problems which the change in NATO's new security environment brought about. These works are quite detailed and their analysis of the possible benefits of multinational units very objective. Unfortunately, most of these articles seem to emanate from a common source, the US Strategic Studies Institute, and were either written by Thomas Durell-Young or co-authored by him or were written by Richard Seitz. There are very few other English or translated works written about the need for multinational forces in NATO which are not classified. Also, almost nothing has been written about the experiences of the multinational corps since they were formed outside of after-action reviews from the units themselves. Therefore, this work has tried to take into account what historians have written about multinational forces and then tied their conclusions to what the Strategic Studies Institute or what US military professional journals such as Military Review or Parameters have written about the multinational corps. This has, hopefully, provided a balanced analysis of the multinational corps in which the United States takes part.

This work has, then, depended on two categories of literature for its analysis. These categories, sources which analyze the history of twentieth century western combined warfare and sources which examine the multinational corps role in the new NATO security environment, provide a wide range of information dealing with the advantages, disadvantages and consequences of fighting as a part of tactical level

combined forces. The only existing gaps in the current literature exist in the analysis as to how well the multinational corps are currently performing in overcoming the obstacles inherent to tactical level combined forces, how well the multinational corps are answering the NATO nation's need for trained tactical level combined forces and how well these forces support US national military strategy. This work is intended to provide some useful analysis in this area.

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

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

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